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TAX TREATY ABUSE AND THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE
TEST—PART 1
David G. Duff**
The Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures To Prevent
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting came into force on July 1, 2018, and has been signed
by more than 80 jurisdictions, including Canada. This multilateral instrument (MLI) has
been described as “an historical turning point in the area of international taxation”; it
introduces a third layer of rules for the taxation of cross-border transactions, in addition
to domestic tax law and bilateral tax treaties. Of the many provisions of the MLI, the most
important are the preamble text in article 6(1) and the general anti-avoidance provision—
the so-called principal purpose test (PPT)—in article 7(1). Both of these provisions
have been adopted by all signatories to the MLI in order to satisfy the OECD’s minimum
standard on tax treaty abuse under BEPS action 6. This two-part article considers the
structure and potential application of the PPT in the context of pre-BEPS responses to
perceived tax treaty abuses, the OECD’s work on BEPS action 6, and other provisions of
the MLI, including the preamble text in article 6(1). The first part of the article reviews
pre-BEPS responses to perceived tax treaty abuses, providing necessary background and
context for understanding BEPS action 6, the MLI, and the PPT. The second part examines
the PPT in light of this background and in the context of BEPS action 6 and other provisions
of the MLI, considering the structure of this provision and the kinds of transactions or
arrangements to which it might apply.
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INTRODUCTION
The Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures To Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting1 has been described as “an historical turning
point in the area of international taxation”2 in that it introduces a third layer of rules
for the taxation of cross-border transactions, in addition to domestic tax law and
bilateral tax treaties. Developed, as the title suggests, to facilitate the implementation
of tax treaty measures proposed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) as part of its project on base erosion and profit shifting
(BEPS),3 this multilateral instrument (MLI) is designed to modify specific provisions
of covered tax agreements (CTA s) that are designated by contracting jurisdictions to
those agreements.4

1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Multilateral Convention To
Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures To Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, released
on November 24, 2016 (www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax
-treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-beps.pdf ) (herein referred to as “the MLI”).
2 Robert J. Danon and Hugues Salomé, “The BEPS Multilateral Instrument: General Overview
and Focus on Treaty Abuse” [2017] no. 3 IFF Forum für Steuerrecht 197-247, at 199.
3 The proposed treaty-based measures were developed in BEPS action 2 (neutralizing the effect
of hybrid mismatch arrangements), action 6 (preventing the granting of treaty benefits in
inappropriate circumstances), action 7 (preventing the artificial avoidance of permanent
establishment status), and action 14 (making dispute resolution mechanisms more effective),
and appear in part II (articles 3 through 5), part III (articles 6 through 11), part IV (articles 12
through 15), and part V (articles 16 and 17) of the MLI. Part I of the MLI (articles 1 and 2)
addresses the scope of the convention and the interpretation of terms; part VII (articles 27
through 39) deals with matters such as signature, ratification, entry into force, and withdrawal;
and part VI (articles 18 through 26) contains measures for binding arbitration that emerged in
the process of developing the MLI.
4 The MLI applies to a tax treaty only where all parties to the treaty are signatories to the MLI
and designate the treaty as a CTA. In addition, provisions of the MLI generally modify these
tax treaties only where all parties to the CTA choose to apply the provision either by selecting
an option afforded by the MLI or by not reserving the right for the provision not to apply. On
the mechanics of the MLI and the positions taken by the initial signatories, see Danon and
Salomé, supra note 2, at 200-13.
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The MLI has been signed, to date, by more than 80 jurisdictions, including Canada,5 and came into force on July 1, 2018.6 Before the MLI can come into effect for a
particular CTA , however, all contracting jurisdictions to the CTA must deposit their
instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval with the OECD.7 As a result, although the MLI will only modify CTA s selected by contracting jurisdictions and will
not modify those CTA s until at least three months after all contracting states have
deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval with the OECD,
the MLI will begin to modify the CTA s of some states beginning in 2019.8
Of the many provisions of the MLI, the most important are the preamble text in
article 6(1) and the so-called principal purpose test (PPT) in article 7(1); both of
these provisions have been adopted by all signatories to the MLI in order to satisfy
the OECD’s minimum standard on tax treaty abuse under BEPS action 6.9 The preamble text in article 6(1) applies in the place of or in the absence of preamble
5 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Signatories and Parties to the
Multilateral Convention To Implement Tax Treaty Measures To Prevent Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting: Status as of 23 July 2018” (www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories
-and-parties.pdf ).
6 According to article 34(1) of the MLI, the convention shall enter into force on “the first day of
the month following the expiration of a period of three calendar months beginning on the date
of deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.” Slovenia became the
fifth jurisdiction to deposit its instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval, on March 22,
2018 (joining Austria, Jersey, the Isle of Man, and Poland); accordingly, the MLI entered into
force on July 1, 2018. For other signatories, article 34(2) of the MLI stipulates that the
convention enters into force for each other signatory on the first day of the month after the
expiration of three months from the date when the signatory deposited its instrument of
ratification, acceptance, or approval with the OECD.
7 According to article 35(1) of the MLI, the convention comes into effect for non-resident
withholding taxes on the first day of the next calendar year beginning on or after the latest of
the dates on which the MLI comes into force for each of the contracting jurisdictions to the CTA,
and otherwise generally for taxation years commencing six months after the latest of the dates
on which the convention comes into force for each of the contracting jurisdictions to the CTA.
8 Although Canada has signed the MLI, it has yet to ratify the convention. It has, however,
tabled legislation to ratify the convention, and this legislation is likely to be approved by the
end of 2018. See Canada, Department of Finance, “Canada Takes Next Step in Fight Against
Aggressive International Tax Avoidance,” News Release, May 28, 2018 (www.fin.gc.ca/n18/
18-037-eng.asp). As a result, although it is uncertain whether Canada will deposit its
instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval with the OECD in time for the MLI to
apply to non-resident withholding taxes in 2019, it can be expected to begin modifying at least
some of Canada’s tax treaties as they apply to taxation years commencing later in 2019.
9 According to the final report on BEPS action 6, countries must satisfy this minimum standard
by amending bilateral tax treaties to include “an express statement that their common intention
is to eliminate double taxation without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced
taxation through tax evasion or avoidance, including through treaty-shopping arrangements”
and adopting either (1) a PPT, (2) a PPT and “a specific anti-abuse rule based on the limitationon-benefits provisions included in treaties concluded by the United States and a few other
countries,” or (3) a limitation-on-benefits (LOB) provision and “a mechanism (such as a treaty
rule that might take the form of a PPT rule restricted to conduit arrangements or domestic
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language in a CTA , declaring that the CTA is intended to eliminate double taxation
with respect to the taxes covered by the agreement “without creating opportunities
for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance (including
through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed at obtaining reliefs provided in this
agreement for the indirect benefit of residents of third jurisdictions).”10 The PPT in
article 7(1) applies in place of or in the absence of principal purpose requirements
in a CTA , and stipulates that
[n]otwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement, a benefit under the
Covered Tax Agreement shall not be granted in respect of an item of income or capital
if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances,
that obtaining the benefit was one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or
transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established
that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the
object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement.11

Based on a “guiding principle” in the commentary on the OECD model tax treaty,12
and similar in structure to Canada’s general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR),13 this provision adds a general anti-avoidance or anti-abuse rule to CTA s.
anti-abuse rules or judicial doctrines that would achieve a similar result) that would deal with
conduit arrangements not already dealt with in tax treaties.” Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate
Circumstances, Action 6—2015 Final Report (Paris: OECD, October 5, 2015) (herein referred to
as “the final report on BEPS action 6”), at paragraphs 19 and 22 (www.oecd.org/tax/preventing
-the-granting-of-treaty-benefits-in-inappropriate-circumstances-action-6-2015-final-report
-9789264241695-en.htm). Of the 83 states that had signed the MLI as of July 23, 2018,
62 indicated that they would adopt the PPT as a stand-alone anti-abuse provision; 13 indicated
that they would adopt the PPT and the simplified LOB (SLOB) provisions in articles 7(8)-(13)
of the MLI; and 8, including Canada, indicated that they would adopt the PPT alone as an
interim measure while intending, where possible, to adopt LOB provisions in addition to or as
a replacement for the PPT through bilateral negotiation. Figures compiled by the author from
the positions of the signatories, available at OECD, supra note 5.
10 MLI articles 6(1) and (2).
11 MLI article 7(1).
12 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income
and on Capital: Condensed Version 2017 (Paris: OECD, November 2017) (herein referred to as
“the OECD model convention”), at paragraph 61 of the commentary on article 1, stating that
“[a] guiding principle is that the benefits of a double taxation convention should not be
available where a main purpose for entering into certain transactions or arrangements was to
secure a more favourable tax position and obtaining that more favourable treatment in these
circumstances would be contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant provisions.”
According to the commentary, this principle “applies independently” of the PPT in new
article 29(9) of the OECD model convention, “which merely confirm[s] it” (ibid.).
13 Section 245 of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended. Like the PPT, this
provision applies to deny a tax benefit where three requirements are satisfied: (1) a transaction
or a series of transactions of which the transaction is a part would otherwise result directly or
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This two-part article considers the structure and potential application of the PPT
in the context of pre-BEPS responses to perceived tax treaty abuses, the OECD’s work
on BEPS action 6, and other provisions of the MLI, including the preamble text in
article 6(1). The first part, presented here, reviews pre-BEPS responses to perceived
tax treaty abuses, providing necessary background and context for understanding
BEPS action 6, the MLI, and the PPT. The second part (which will appear in a subsequent issue of this journal) examines the PPT in light of this background and in the
context of BEPS action 6 and other provisions of the MLI, considering the structure
of this general anti-abuse provision and the kinds of transactions or arrangements
to which it might apply.

PRE-BEPS RESPONSES TO PERCEIVED
TA X TREAT Y ABUSES
Although BEPS action 6 and the MLI represent major developments in the OECD’s
efforts to prevent what it calls “the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate circumstances,”14 these initiatives cannot be properly understood in isolation, since
they expand on pre-BEPS responses to perceived tax treaty abuses, which the OECD
and signatories to the MLI presumably consider to be inadequate or insufficient.
The discussion that follows reviews these pre-BEPS responses to perceived treaty
abuses, considering measures to address tax treaty shopping as well as other perceived
abuses of tax treaties.

Ta x Treat y Shopping
Tax treaty shopping, broadly understood, has been defined as “a premeditated effort
to take advantage of the international tax treaty network, and careful selection of
the most favorable treaty for a specific purpose.”15 Since bilateral tax treaties apply
only to residents of one or both of the contracting states,16 tax treaty shopping
necessarily involves deliberate measures either to become a resident of a contracting state in order to obtain treaty benefits that are available under one or more of
indirectly in a tax benefit; (2) the transaction may not reasonably be considered to have been
undertaken or arranged primarily for a bona fide purpose other than to obtain the tax benefit;
and (3) it may reasonably be considered that the transaction would otherwise result in a misuse
of provisions of the Income Tax Act or other relevant enactments or an abuse having regard to
those provisions read as a whole.
14 Final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at paragraph 15.
15 H. David Rosenbloom, “Tax Treaty Abuse: Policies and Issues” (1983) 15:3 Law and Policy in
International Business 763-831, at 766. The final report on BEPS action 6 defines the concept of
tax treaty shopping more narrowly, stating that these arrangements “typically involve persons
who are residents of third States attempting to access indirectly the benefits of a treaty between
two Contracting States.” Final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at paragraph 17. I return
to this distinction later in this article, suggesting that the OECD’s emphasis on indirect access
to treaty benefits by residents of third jurisdictions may support a possible distinction between
abusive and non-abusive tax treaty shopping.
16 Article 1 of the OECD model convention.
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its tax treaties with other states, or to access these treaty benefits indirectly by
means of a legal entity that is resident in the contracting state. Examples include a
tax-motivated change of residence shortly before the disposition of property in
order to obtain a treaty exemption on the taxation of capital gains,17 and conduit
arrangements whereby a resident of one state directs an investment through a legal
entity in a third state in order to obtain treaty benefits under that state’s tax treaty
with the ultimate source state.18
Objections to tax treaty shopping have traditionally emphasized its impact on the
reciprocal “balance of sacrifices” accepted by each contracting state in negotiating
a tax treaty.19 If a treaty can be accessed by residents of another state, the fairness of
the treaty bargain may be undermined and the incentive for states to enter into tax
treaties in the first place may be reduced.20 As the final report on BEPS action 6
explains,
[a]llowing persons who are not directly entitled to treaty benefits (such as the reduction or elimination of withholding taxes on dividends, interest or royalties) to obtain
these benefits indirectly through treaty shopping would frustrate the bilateral and
reciprocal nature of tax treaties. If, for instance, a State knows that its residents can
indirectly access the benefits of treaties concluded by another State, it may have little
interest in granting reciprocal benefits to residents of that other State through the
conclusion of a tax treaty.21

As the number of tax treaties has grown over the last several decades, increasing
opportunities to take advantage of the tax treaty network to reduce or eliminate

17 See, for example, paragraph 56 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model
convention (transfer of permanent home by an individual); and MIL Investments (SA) v. The
Queen, 2006 TCC 460 (transfer of corporate residence).
18 See, for example, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Double
Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies,” in International Tax Avoidance and
Evasion: Four Related Studies, Issues in International Taxation no. 1 (Paris: OECD, 1987),
87-106 (herein referred to as “the OECD conduit companies report”). For a useful discussion
of conduit arrangements and tax treaty shopping, see Luc De Broe, International Tax Planning
and Prevention of Abuse: A Study Under Domestic Tax Law, Tax Treaties and EC Law in Relation to
Conduit and Base Companies, IBFD Doctoral Series vol. 14 (Amsterdam: International Bureau of
Fiscal Documentation, 2008). De Broe discusses (ibid., at 5-20) direct conduits in which a
person who expects to derive dividends, interest, or royalties sourced in another state
establishes an entity in a third state in order to access more advantageous treaty benefits in
respect of the income, and “stepping-stone” structures in which the conduit is fully subject to
tax in the third state but reduces its tax in that state through the deduction of interest, royalties,
service fees, or other expenses paid either to the person in the residence state or to another
entity controlled by that person.
19 OECD conduit companies report, supra note 18, at 90.
20 Rosenbloom, supra note 15, at 774-75.
21 Final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at 22. This text was subsequently incorporated
into paragraph 4 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.

international tax planning

n

625

taxation, tax treaty shopping has also been challenged on the ground that it can
produce unintended tax benefits resulting in reduced taxation or non-taxation.22 As
the final report on BEPS action 6 states,
in such a case, the benefits that would be indirectly obtained may not be appropriate
given the nature of the tax system of the former State [that is, the ultimate state of residence]; if, for instance, that State does not levy an income tax on a certain type of
income, it would be inappropriate for its residents to benefit from the provisions of a
tax treaty concluded between two other States that grant a reduction or elimination of
source taxation for that type of income and that were designed on the assumption that
the two Contracting States would tax such income.23

Before BEPS action 6 and the MLI, several jurisdictions adopted various domestic
and treaty-based provisions to discourage tax treaty shopping, on which their tax
authorities have relied with varying degrees of success. In order to discourage taxmotivated emigration, for example, several jurisdictions impose exit or departure
taxes that apply to accrued pension rights and/or capital gains.24 Other domestic
anti-avoidance rules that may discourage tax-motivated expatriation include controlled foreign corporation rules and non-resident trust provisions that attribute the
income of non-resident legal entities to resident shareholders and beneficiaries.25
In order to discourage conduit arrangements, the United States adopted domestic
anti-conduit regulations allowing the Internal Revenue Service to disregard an
intermediate entity’s participation in a financing arrangement where one of the
principal purposes of this participation is the avoidance of US withholding tax.26 For
the same reason, Germany enacted an anti-treaty-shopping provision denying
treaty benefits to a foreign company to the extent that the company’s shareholders
would not be entitled to these benefits if they had received the income directly,
22 See, for example, United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Committee of Experts on
International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Treaty Abuse and Treaty Shopping, United Nations
document E/C.18/2006/2 (New York: United Nations, October 16, 2006), at paragraph 18
(www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/documents/bgrd_model_ta.htm).
23 Final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at 22. This text was subsequently incorporated
into paragraph 4 of the commentary on article 29 of the OECD model convention.
24 These provisions are discussed in the final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at
paragraphs 65-67, and are mentioned in revised paragraph 69 of the commentary on article 1
of the OECD model convention. Because Canada levies withholding tax on pension income
under domestic law and tax treaties, it does not impose an exit tax on accrued pension rights;
however, because Canada generally exempts capital gains from the alienation of property by
non-residents, it imposes an exit tax on accrued capital gains under subsection 128.1(4) of the
Income Tax Act.
25 See, for example, sections 91 and 94 of the Income Tax Act. These provisions are discussed in
the final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at paragraph 59, and are incorporated into
revised paragraph 81 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention.
26 For a detailed discussion of these provisions and their potential application, see Peter M. Daub,
“The Conduit Regulations Revisited” (2015) 147:4 Tax Notes 409-26.
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unless the income is derived from the company’s own economic activity or unless
there are sound economic or other non-tax reasons for interposing the company
and the company participates in general commerce through an appropriately
equipped business establishment.27
Long before the development of these anti-conduit rules in the mid-1990s,
Switzerland adopted a unilateral anti-abuse decree in 1962, which was designed,
among other things, to protect treaty partners against the use of Swiss conduit
arrangements by denying treaty benefits where more than 50 percent of treatyprotected income was used to satisfy claims in third countries.28 More recently,
Canada introduced domestic anti-conduit rules in 2014 addressing back-to-back
loan arrangements, which were expanded in 2016 to include back-to-back royalty
payments and shareholder loans, to include “character substitution rules” to prevent
the avoidance of these rules through economically similar arrangements between an
intermediary and another non-resident person, and to clarify that these rules apply
to multiple-intermediary arrangements.29
In addition to these domestic specific anti-avoidance rules, tax authorities have
challenged treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements under domestic antiavoidance doctrines and statutory general anti-avoidance rules, on the basis that tax
treaties are subject to an implicit general anti-abuse principle under international
law, and on the ground that the recipient of income who would otherwise be eligible
for treaty benefits is not its beneficial owner. As well, several jurisdictions have
adopted specific anti-avoidance provisions in tax treaties, including limitation-onbenefit (LOB) provisions that restrict treaty benefits to specific categories of

27 For brief discussions of this provision, see De Broe, supra note 18, at 419-23; and Andreas
Kempf and Emma Moesle, “The Revised German Anti-Treaty Shopping Provisions—A
Critical Review” (2012) 66:8 Bulletin for International Taxation 395-400. In two cases decided in
2017, the European Court of Justice held that the original version of this anti-treaty-shopping
regulation was incompatible with European Community law and the EC parent-subsidiary
directive: C-504/16 (Deister Holding AG ) and C-613/16 ( Juhler Holding A/S). The German
Ministry of Finance has issued new guidance on the application of the revised provision in
order to comply with these decisions.
28 Bundesratsbeschluss betreffend Massnahmen gegen die ungerechfertigte Inanspruchnahme von
Doppelbesteurungsabkommen des Bundes, December 14, 1962 (SR 672.202). For a brief
description of this anti-abuse provision, see De Broe, supra note 18, at 440-41, explaining that
the provision was adopted “in response to the risk of Switzerland being categorized as a tax
haven by important industrialized countries (the United States in the first place), which would
have had an adverse effect on the country’s ability to conclude tax treaties.” It is perhaps not
coincidental that the decree was adopted around the time of the Johansson case, discussed below
at notes 32-39 and the accompanying text, which involved a Swiss company claiming benefits
under the Switzerland-US tax treaty.
29 Subsections 212(3.1) through (3.94) and 15(2.16) through (2.192) of the Income Tax Act. For a
useful overview of these rules, see Michael N. Kandev, “Canadian Interest Anti-Conduit Rule
Soon To Be Law” (2014) 76:11 Tax Notes International 1027-30; and Michael N. Kandev,
“Canada Expands Back-to-Back Regime: Examining the Character Substitution Rules” (2017)
86:12 Tax Notes International 1087-92.

international tax planning

n

627

residents or income and purpose tests that deny access to some or all treaty benefits
where the main purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction or arrangement was to obtain the treaty benefit. The following sections review each of these
pre-BEPS responses to tax treaty shopping.

Domestic Anti-Avoidance Doctrines and General
Anti-Avoidance Rules
Since the characterization of transactions or arrangements to which a tax treaty may
apply generally depends on the domestic law of the contracting state from which a
treaty benefit is sought, it is not surprising that tax treaty shopping might be challenged first under domestic anti-avoidance doctrines and general anti-avoidance
rules that determine the characterization of these transactions or arrangements.30 In
the United States, for example, where courts have developed broad anti-avoidance
doctrines in the form of business purpose and economic substance tests,31 at least
three notable judicial decisions have applied these doctrines in order to deny treaty
benefits that would otherwise have resulted from tax treaty shopping.
In Johansson v. United States,32 the taxpayer was a Swedish boxer who fought
three world heavyweight championship fights in the United States against US boxer
Floyd Patterson.33 After winning the first fight, Johansson obtained tax residence in
Switzerland, where he incorporated a company with which he entered into an
employment contract and from which he received substantial compensation for the
second and third fights. He then argued that the compensation was exempt from US
tax under article X(1) of the 1951 Switzerland-US tax treaty,34 according to which
individuals resident in Switzerland were exempt from US tax on “compensation for
labor or personal services performed in the United States” where the individual was
“temporarily present in the United States for a period or periods not exceeding 183
30 Although it might be argued that these domestic anti-avoidance doctrines or general
anti-avoidance rules conflict with tax treaties, it is also arguable that these doctrines and rules
are compatible with tax treaties that apply to transactions or arrangements as determined under
domestic tax law. The OECD commentaries have reflected the latter view since the adoption of
revisions in 2003: paragraphs 73 and 76-80 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD
model convention. In Canada, section 245 of the Income Tax Act (GAAR) was amended in
2005 to explicitly apply to the misuse or abuse of provisions of a tax treaty, and section 4.1 of
the Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act, RSC 1985, c. I-4, as amended, declares that
Canada’s GAAR applies to “any benefit” provided under a tax treaty, notwithstanding the
provisions of the treaty or legislation giving the treaty the force of law in Canada.
31 See, for example, Gregory v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 293 US 465 (1935);
Comm’r. v. Court Holding Co., 324 US 331 (1945); and Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 US 737 (1947).
32 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964).
33 Johansson won the first match on June 26, 1959, becoming the heavyweight champion of the
world, but lost the second and third bouts on June 20, 1960 and March 13, 1961.
34 Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Washington, DC on
May 24, 1951 (herein referred to as “the Switzerland-US tax treaty”).
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days” and the compensation was received for “labor or personal services performed
as an employee of, or under contract with, a resident or corporation or other entity
of Switzerland.”35
Observing that Johansson was the Swiss company’s “sole employee and sole
source of revenue” and “conducted his affairs largely independent of” its sole director
and stockholders,36 the Fifth Circuit court upheld the judgment of the District
Court, which had held against the taxpayer on the basis that the company
had no legitimate business purpose, but was a device which was used by Ingemar
Johansson as a controlled depositary and conduit by which he attempted to divert
temporarily, his personal income, earned in the United States, so as to escape taxation
thereon in the United States.37

In addition, the Fifth Circuit court continued, exemption would contradict “the
genuine shared expectations of the contracting parties” and the “primary objective”
of the treaty with Switzerland and other tax treaties to eliminate “impediments to
international commerce resulting from the double taxation of international transactions” by allocating tax jurisdiction to the “most appropriate locus for the taxation
of any given transaction.”38 As a result, the court concluded:
[W]hile Johansson may have brought himself within the words of the Swiss treaty by
his “residence” in Switzerland and his “employment” by a “Swiss corporation,” he has
failed to establish any substantial reasons for deviating from the treaty’s basic rule that
income from services is taxable where the services were rendered. International trade
will not be seriously encumbered by our refusal to grant special tax treatment to one
only marginally, if at all, a Swiss resident and only technically, if at all, employed by a
paper Swiss corporation.39

35 This provision is similar to article 15(2) of the OECD model convention, which exempts
remuneration derived by a resident of a contracting state in respect of employment exercised in
the other contracting state if the recipient is present in the other state for a period or periods
not exceeding 183 days in any 12-month period commencing or ending in the fiscal year, and
the remuneration is paid by or on behalf of an employer who is not a resident of the other
state, and is not borne by a permanent establishment that the employer has in the other state.
Although this provision is subject to article 17, which provides broader source jurisdiction for
income derived as an entertainer or sportsperson and includes a specific anti-avoidance rule in
article 17(2) for income that “accrues not to the entertainer or sportsperson but to another
person,” the 1951 Switzerland-US tax treaty did not include comparable provisions.
36 Johansson, supra note 32, at 813.
37 Cited in Johansson, ibid. The court also concluded that Johansson was not a resident of
Switzerland during the period in question, rejecting his argument that the United States was
bound by a determination to the contrary by the Swiss tax authorities.
38 Johansson, supra note 32, at 813.
39 Ibid., at 814.
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Similarly, in Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner,40 the US Tax Court relied on
domestic anti-avoidance doctrines to deny treaty benefits that might otherwise have
been available. In this case, the taxpayer borrowed funds from a company that was
resident in the Bahamas (with which the United States did not have a tax treaty),
which assigned the debt to a wholly owned subsidiary that it had incorporated in
Honduras (with which the United States had entered into a tax treaty) in exchange
for notes on which interest was payable at the same rate as the rate of interest payable on the loan to the taxpayer. Concluding that the “only purpose” of the
assignment was “to obtain the benefits of the exemption established by the treaty”
and that the taxpayer had “failed to establish that a substantive indebtedness
existed” between the taxpayer and the Honduran subsidiary,41 the court rejected the
taxpayer’s argument that the interest payments were exempt from US withholding
tax under article IX of the Honduras-US tax treaty,42 on the ground that the interest
was not “received by” the Honduran subsidiary as required by the treaty.43 On the
contrary, the court concluded, since the words “received by” contemplate “complete dominion and control” over an amount without an “obligation to transmit”
the amount to another person,44 the Honduran subsidiary was in effect “a collection
agent with respect to the interest it received” from the taxpayer and a “conduit for
the passage of interest payments” that “had no actual beneficial interest” in the
funds and therefore “cannot be said to have received the interest as its own.”45
The outcome was again similar in Del Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue.46 In this case, the taxpayer, an indirect US subsidiary of a Canadian company, borrowed funds from an indirect Dutch subsidiary of the Canadian
company, which had obtained the funds through a series of “related and essentially
simultaneous” loans and equity investments by upper-tier subsidiaries of the Canadian company.47 The US Tax Court held that interest payments on the borrowed

40 56 TC 925 (1971). For a useful discussion of this case, see Yariv Brauner, “Beneficial
Ownership in and Outside US Tax Treaties,” in Michael Lang, Pasquale Pistone, Josef Schuch,
Claus Staringer, and Alfred Storck, eds., Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends (Amsterdam:
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2013), 143-60, at 146-49.
41 Aiken Industries, supra note 40, at 934.
42 Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of Honduras for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income, signed at Washington, DC on June 25, 1956.
43 Aiken Industries, supra note 40, at 934.
44 Ibid., at 933.
45 Ibid.
46 TC Memo 1999-411. For a useful discussion of this case, see Brauner, supra note 40, at
155-58.
47 Del Commercial Properties, supra note 46, at 2. The funds were originally borrowed by a
Canadian company called Delcom Financial Ltd., a second-tier subsidiary of the affiliated group.
Delcom Financial Ltd. loaned the funds to a wholly owned Canadian subsidiary called Delcom
Holdings, which contributed the funds to a wholly owned company organized in the Cayman
Islands, in exchange for common shares. The Cayman Islands company then contributed the
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funds were subject to withholding tax under the Canada-US tax treaty 48 and not
exempt under the Netherlands-US tax treaty 49 on the ground that the Dutch subsidiary “had no purpose other than avoidance of withholding tax.”50 Emphasizing
that the Dutch subsidiary “had minimal assets, . . . engaged in minimal business
activity,” and “had only transitory possession of and no control over the . . . loan
proceeds” that were conveyed to the taxpayer,51 and that loan payments that were
received by the Dutch company were transferred directly to upper-tier Canadian
subsidiaries in order to make payments on an original loan from the Royal Bank of
Canada,52 the court held that the Dutch company “acted as a mere shell or conduit
with respect to the interest payments” made by the taxpayer, which had “in substance”
received the borrowed funds from and made the loan payments to the upper-tier
Canadian subsidiary with which the series of transactions had commenced when it
borrowed funds from the Royal Bank of Canada.53 On appeal, the DC Circuit court
held that “the Tax Court did not clearly err in concluding that the payments from
[the] appellant to [the Dutch company] were in substance payments made to [the
upper-tier Canadian subsidiary] and that those payments only served to avoid U.S.
taxes.”54
In other countries, where courts have not adopted broad business purpose or
economic substance doctrines, tax-treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements
may still be rejected under other judicially developed anti-avoidance doctrines or
statutory general anti-avoidance rules. In Antle v. The Queen,55 for example, a resident of Canada purported to transfer shares of a Canadian company to a
funds to a wholly owned company organized in the Netherlands Antilles, in exchange for
common shares, and the Netherland Antilles company contributed the funds to a wholly
owned company organized in the Netherlands, also in exchange for common shares.
48 Convention Between Canada and the United States of America with Respect to Taxes on
Income and on Capital, signed at Washington, DC on September 26, 1980, as amended by
the protocols signed on June 14, 1983, March 28, 1984, March 17, 1995, and July 29, 1997
(subsequently amended by a protocol signed on September 21, 2007) (herein referred to as
“the Canada-US tax treaty”).
49 Convention Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands with
Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, signed at Washington, DC on April 29,
1948, as modified and supplemented by the Supplementary Convention signed at Washington,
DC on December 30, 1965.
50 Del Commercial Properties, supra note 46, at 12.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., at 7, adding that the taxpayer subsequently made payments directly to an upper-tier
Canadian subsidiary, bypassing the Dutch company entirely.
53 Ibid., at 12.
54 Del Commercial Properties, Inc. v. CIR, 251 F.3d 210, at 214 (DC Cir. 2001). For a critical
comment on the appellate court’s reasons, see Peter A. Glicklich and Michael J. Miller,
“Appeals Court Invalidates US-Netherlands ‘Double-Dip’ Financing Structure,” Selected US
Tax Developments feature (2001) 49:4 Canadian Tax Journal 1076-84.
55 2009 TCC 465.
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non-resident trust on a tax-deferred basis, and the trust claimed a treaty exemption
on a capital gain resulting from a subsequent sale of the shares; however, the Tax
Court of Canada held that the gain was properly attributable to the taxpayer on the
grounds that the alleged trustee acted as an agent for the taxpayer and the transactions had not established the legal relationship of a trust.56 In addition, the court
continued, even if the transactions had established a trust, they would have abused
domestic tax law and the tax treaty, and the Canadian GAAR would have applied to
attribute the gain to the taxpayer.57 On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld
the decision on the basis that the purported trust was a sham that did not reflect the
real rights and obligations created by the taxpayer and the supposed trustee.58
Likewise, in Ministre de l’Économie v. Bank of Scotland,59 the French Conseil
d’État relied on domestic anti-avoidance principles to deny a refundable tax credit
(“l’avoir fiscal”) available under the France-UK tax treaty 60 for dividends paid by a
French company to a resident of the United Kingdom. In this case, the taxpayer,
which was a resident of the United Kingdom, acquired preferred shares of a French
company from its US parent under a usufruct agreement lasting for three years, for
an amount that was slightly less than the cumulative amount of the dividends
expected during the three years. Characterizing the usufruct agreement as an artificially concealed loan arrangement in which the US parent remained the true owner
of the shares (which were pledged to the taxpayer as a guarantee for the loan), the
court held that the US parent was the beneficial owner of the dividends and the
provisions of the France-UK treaty did not apply. In addition, the court continued,
because the arrangement was entered into for the sole purpose of obtaining abusively
the benefit of the tax credit, the tax administration could recharacterize the disputed
assignment contract as a loan.61
In contrast to these decisions, the courts in each of these countries have declined
to apply domestic anti-avoidance doctrines and statutory general anti-avoidance
rules to other treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements. In Northern Indiana
Public Service Corp. v. Commissioner,62 for example, a US company incorporated a

56 Ibid., at paragraphs 48 and 58, concluding that the trust “never came into existence.”
57 Ibid., at paragraph 120, concluding that the transactions resulted in “an abuse of the Act, of the
Treaty and of the joint operation of both.”
58 2010 FCA 280. For this reason, the court did not consider it necessary to consider the possible
application of GAAR.
59 (2006), 9 ITLR 683 (Conseil d’État).
60 Convention Between the Republic of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed on May 22, 1968 (herein referred to as “the
France-UK tax treaty”).
61 See the discussion of the case in De Broe, supra note 18, at 699-701.
62 115 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1997). For a useful discussion of this case, see Brauner, supra note 40, at
149-51.
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subsidiary (“Finance”) in the Netherlands Antilles, which issued notes in the eurobond market at a rate of 17.25 percent and loaned these funds to the taxpayer at a
rate of 18.25 percent. The Seventh Circuit court rejected the commissioner’s argument that Finance should be disregarded for tax purposes because the transactions
were undertaken to avoid US withholding tax that would have been payable had the
taxpayer itself issued notes in the eurobond market.63 Notwithstanding that the taxpayer guaranteed all payments on the euronotes issued by Finance and that Finance
was wound up less than a year after the back-to-back loans were repaid, the court
held that the transactions were “recognizable for tax purposes, despite any taxavoidance motive” because Finance conducted “recognizable” though “concededly
minimal” business activity, and the transactions resulted in “actual, non-tax-related
changes” in its “economic position” since it earned a profit from the spread in interest rates and reinvested profits.64 As a result, the court concluded, the arrangement
“had economic substance” to both Finance and the taxpayer.65
Similarly, in SARL Foundation Industries France,66 where a French company paid
royalties to a Dutch company, which distributed 93 percent to 98 percent of
those royalties to another company resident in the Netherlands Antilles, the
Administrative Tribunal of Lille rejected the argument of the French tax authorities
that the Dutch company should be disregarded for the purposes of the withholding
tax exemption under the France-Netherlands tax treaty.67 Although the terms of
the licence agreements required the Dutch company to verify the accounts of the
French sublicensee and convey this information to the Antillean company if
requested, the court held that this evidence was not sufficient to conclude that the
Dutch company was a mere financial agent for the Antillean company. As in Northern Indiana Public Service Corp., therefore, minimal business activity and an
economic profit were sufficient for the Dutch company to be recognized for tax
purposes.
Similar considerations entered into the Tax Court of Canada decision in MIL
Investments (SA) v. The Queen.68 In this case, the taxpayer, which was a resident of the
Cayman Islands and was wholly owned by an individual who was a resident of

63 Northern Indiana, supra note 62, at 511.
64 Ibid., at 512-14.
65 Ibid., at 514.
66 (March 19, 1999), case nos. 95-5403 and 96-738, RJF 8-9/99 no. 961 (Admin. Trib. Lille).
For brief discussions of this case, see De Broe, supra note 18, at 697; and Daniel Gutmann,
“Beneficial Ownership Without Specific Beneficial Ownership Provision,” in Beneficial
Ownership: Recent Trends, supra note 40, 161-66, at 165.
67 Convention Between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, signed on March 16, 1973
(herein referred to as “the France-Netherlands tax treaty”).
68 MIL Investments, supra note 17.
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Monaco, owned shares of a Canadian mining company called Diamond Field
Resources (“DFR”), the value of which had increased substantially and was primarily
attributable to immovable property situated in Canada. Before selling most of those
shares, the taxpayer reduced its percentage interest in DFR to slightly less than
10 percent and continued into Luxembourg, where the gain was exempt from
domestic tax owing to a step-up in the cost of the shares. Although the gain was
taxable in Canada under domestic law, the taxpayer claimed an exemption under
article 13 of the Canada-Luxembourg tax treaty; paragraph (4) of that article extends
source taxation to gains from the alienation of shares deriving their value principally
from immovable property situated in a state only where the shares form part of a
“substantial interest” in the company, which the provision specifically defines as
“10 per cent or more of the shares of any class.”69
Accepting the testimony of the taxpayer’s sole shareholder that he wanted “to get
back to exploring and building mines in Africa”70 and the argument of the taxpayer’s
counsel that “Luxembourg was a better jurisdiction than the Cayman Islands in
which to carry on a mining business in Africa,”71 the Tax Court held that the Canadian GAAR did not apply because none of the transactions, including the
continuation into Luxembourg, were avoidance transactions that were undertaken
primarily to obtain a tax benefit.72 In addition, the court continued, even if one or
more of the transactions had been primarily tax-motivated, GAAR would not apply
because none of the transactions abused either the treaty as a whole or the specific
provision on which the taxpayer relied. On the contrary, the court concluded, “the
shopping or selection of a treaty to minimize tax on its own cannot be viewed as
being abusive”73 and the taxpayer’s “reliance upon a Treaty provision as agreed upon
by both Canada and Luxembourg cannot be viewed as being a misuse or abuse.”74

69 Convention Between Canada and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital, signed at Luxembourg on September 10, 1999 (herein referred to as “the CanadaLuxembourg tax treaty”).
70 MIL Investments, supra note 17, at paragraph 46.
71 Ibid., at paragraph 49.
72 Ibid., at paragraph 67.
73 Ibid., at paragraph 72.
74 Ibid., at paragraph 74, noting that the exemption in article 13(4) of the treaty was “not found in
the OECD model convention upon which the Treaty is based” and concluding on this basis
that “it must be presumed that Canada had a valid reason to allow Luxembourg to retain the
right to tax capital gains in those specific circumstances, for example, the desire to encourage
foreign investment in Canadian property.” The court also suggested that the circumstances
would have been different had the taxpayer originally been a resident of Canada rather than the
Cayman Islands, since emigration to Luxembourg would have triggered the exit tax under
section 128.1 of the Income Tax Act, and article 13(6) of the treaty would have given Canada
the right to tax any gains realized by former residents of Canada for six years. Ibid., at
paragraph 75.
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On appeal, the taxpayer conceded that the continuation into Luxembourg was
an avoidance transaction,75 but the Federal Court of Appeal nonetheless upheld the
decision on the ground that the Crown had failed to establish that the transactions
were abusive. According to the court, it was “unable to find . . . an object or purpose” behind the treaty provision that would justify the court’s “departure from the
plain words” of the text.76 Nor was the court persuaded that “the Tax Treaty should
not be interpreted so as to permit double non-taxation,” since “the issue raised by
GAAR is the incidence of Canadian taxation, not the foregoing of revenues by the
Luxembourg fiscal authorities.”77 Unlike the decision in Northern Indiana Public
Service Corp., therefore, the appellate court decision in MIL Investments turned not
on the existence of any bona fide business activity or economic substance in Luxembourg, but on the Crown’s failure to demonstrate that admitted tax-motivated treaty
shopping was contrary to the object and purpose of the Canada-Luxembourg tax
treaty or the provision on which the taxpayer relied. As will be explained in the
second part of this article, the object and purpose of a tax treaty or treaty provision
are a key aspect of the PPT, the interpretation of which is apt to pose the greatest
difficulty in the application of the test—though this interpretive exercise will now
be guided by the amended preamble text and other provisions of the MLI as well as
the OECD commentaries.

Implicit General Anti-Abuse Principle
Regardless of whether tax treaty shopping is disallowed under domestic antiavoidance doctrines and statutory general anti-avoidance rules, some commentators
and tax authorities have taken the position that such transactions or arrangements
may be challenged on the basis of an implicit or inherent general anti-abuse principle under international law. According to Klaus Vogel, such a principle may be
derived from the pacta sunt servanda principle in article 26 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, according to which treaties are to be performed “in good
faith.”78 Since this principle dictates that a contracting state “need not tolerate a
circumvention of a treaty by the other contracting State,” Vogel maintains, “it
would be absurd for it to be committed to tolerate circumvention by a private
person and to apply the treaty in a strictly formal way notwithstanding such circumvention.”79 As a result, he concludes, tax treaties are “subject to a general
75 Canada v. MIL Investments (SA), 2007 FCA 236, at paragraph 3.
76 Ibid., at paragraph 6. The court added, ibid., at paragraph 7, that “[i]f the object of the
exempting provision was to be limited to portfolio investments, or to non-controlling interests
in immoveable property . . . , it would have been easy enough to say so.”
77 Ibid., at paragraph 8.
78 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed at Vienna on May 23, 1969, UN doc. A/Conf.
39/27, fourth annex, UNTS 1155/331.
79 Klaus Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions: A Commentary to the OECD-,
UN- and US Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Capital
(Deventer, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1991), Introduction, at paragraph 121.
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‘substance v. form proviso’ based on international law,” which “restricts the treaty’s
binding effect under international law and thus also its binding effect under domestic
law, since only so much of a treaty’s contents can become domestic law as is applicable by virtue of international law.”80
Another argument for a general anti-abuse principle under international law
looks to an alternative source of international law, namely, customary international
law. According to David Ward,
[i]n light of the fact that the International Court of Justice has already given recognition to the principle of abuse of rights in interpreting treaties generally, that Article 26
of the Vienna Convention requires parties to a treaty to perform the treaties in good
faith, that the principle of abuse of rights has been incorporated in the Convention of
the Law of the Sea and, more specifically in a tax context, that anti-abuse principles have
developed judicially or have been enacted by statute in the internal law of a great
number of countries (albeit with some differences in the frequency of application and
in the formulation of the rules and in the labels applied to them), one can say that an
anti-abuse rule in taxation matters is one of the “general principles recognized by civilized nations.” (According to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, general principles recognized by civilized nations constitute one of the sources
of international law.)81

On this basis, Ward concurs with Vogel’s conclusion that “a general anti-abuse
doctrine should be recognized by tax administrations and courts generally in interpreting and applying tax treaties.”82
A third rationale for an implicit anti-abuse principle turns not on the pacta sunt
servanda principle nor on customary international law, but on general principles of
treaty interpretation according to which a treaty is to be interpreted in good faith
and in light of its object and purpose.83 On this basis, Frank Engelen concludes that
there is “a sound legal basis” for the existence of a general anti-abuse principle in
the interpretation of a tax treaty irrespective of any such provision in the text of the
treaty.84 Luc De Broe arrives at a similar conclusion, suggesting that treaty benefits
that might otherwise be claimed by a taxpayer under a tax treaty may be denied in
circumstances where “the granting of such benefits would frustrate the treaty’s
object and purpose.”85

80 Ibid.
81 Davies, Ward & Beck, Ward’s Tax Treaties 1996-1997 (Toronto: Carswell, 1996), at 61.
82 Ibid.
83 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 78, at article 31(1).
84 Frank A. Engelen, On Values and Norms: The Principle of Good Faith in the Law of Treaties and the
Law of Tax Treaties in Particular (Deventer, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006),
at 36.
85 De Broe, supra note 18, at 316.
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Although the first of these arguments for an implicit anti-abuse principle under
international law has been challenged on the basis that the pacta sunt servanda principle applies only to contracting states, and not to taxpayers who are not themselves
parties to tax treaties,86 and the second argument has been questioned on the
ground that there is little international consensus on the existence of a general antiabuse principle absent specific treaty provisions to this effect,87 the third rationale
for an implicit anti-abuse principle appears to have been more widely accepted.88 At
the same time, since general principles of treaty interpretation also require treaties
to be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning,89 it is not obvious that these
interpretive principles allow treaty benefits to be denied on the basis of an object or
purpose that is not consistent with the text of the treaty and supported by other
authoritative indications of the intentions of the contracting states.90 Indeed, since
tax treaties have several purposes, some of which may be differently construed,91
86 See, for example, Stef van Weeghel, The Improper Use of Tax Treaties with Particular Reference to
the Netherlands and the United States (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998), at 116;
Nathalie Goyette, Countering Tax Treaty Abuses: A Canadian Perspective on an International Issue
(Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999), at 10-12; and De Broe, supra note 18, at 302-8.
87 See, for example, De Broe, supra note 18, at 308-16. As will be explained in the second part of
this article, the PPT is clearly intended to establish and codify an international consensus on a
general anti-abuse principle.
88 See, for example, Stef van Weeghel and Anna Gunn, “A General Anti-Abuse Principle of
International Law: Can It Be Applied in Tax Cases?” in Gugliemo Maisto, Angelo Nikolakakis,
and John M. Ulmer, eds., Essays on Tax Treaties: A Tribute to David A. Ward (Toronto: Canadian
Tax Foundation and International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2013), 305-23, at 322,
concurring with Engelen that “the requirement to grant treaty benefits in cases which are
clearly abusive would be unreasonable.”
89 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 78, at article 31(1).
90 See, for example, De Broe, supra note 18, at 308, emphasizing that a denial of treaty benefits
based on principles of treaty interpretation must be “supported by the terms of the treaty.”
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 78, the ordinary
meaning of a treaty is to be determined “in context” (article 31(1)), and this context
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; and
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to
the treaty [article 31(2)].
It therefore follows that treaty interpretation may also take into account extrinsic materials
such as explanatory memorandums jointly prepared by both contracting states or drafted by
one state and approved by the other (for example, the technical explanation to the Canada-US
tax treaty) as well as OECD commentaries existing at the time the treaty was concluded.
De Broe, supra note 18, at 345. On the relevance of the OECD model convention and OECD
commentaries to the interpretation of tax treaties, see Crown Forest Industries Ltd. v. Canada,
[1995] 2 SCR 802.
91 Although the primary purpose of a tax treaty is generally said to be the elimination of double
taxation (accomplished through distributive provisions and the elimination-of-double-taxation
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and since the object or purpose of many tax treaty provisions is not clearly stated in
the text of the treaty or in explanatory memorandums and commentaries,92 the
application of an implicit anti-abuse principle based on unstated objects and purposes can be difficult and highly uncertain.93 For this reason, most commentators
who have affirmed the existence of an implicit anti-abuse principle have insisted on a
high threshold for its application,94 limiting its reach to “wholly artificial” transactions
or arrangements that are entered into solely for the purpose of avoiding tax.95
provision), this purpose is arguably subordinate to a more general purpose of allocating taxing
rights between the contracting states, which is itself subsidiary to an overriding purpose of
reducing or eliminating tax barriers to cross-border economic activity. See, for example,
De Broe, supra note 18, at 325-29. Other purposes of tax treaties include the prevention of
fiscal evasion (accomplished through information exchange and assistance in the collection
of taxes), non-discrimination, and the resolution of tax disputes through the mutual agreement
procedure. Where the primary purpose of a tax treaty is construed as the elimination of double
taxation, it is of course much easier to derive a corresponding purpose to prevent tax avoidance
resulting in double non-taxation. As will be explained in the second part of this article, the revised
preamble language in article 6(1) of the MLI is clearly intended to influence the interpretation
of the PPT.
92 See, for example, Richard Vann, “Beneficial Ownership: What Does History (and Maybe
Policy) Tell Us,” in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends, supra note 40, 267-331, at 296,
explaining that the OECD’s work on treaty abuse has been “bedeviled” by “the lack of a
clear . . . elucidation of the policy (or rather policies . . .) underlying particular provisions in tax
treaties”; and De Broe, supra note 18, at 344, stating that the distributive provisions of the
OECD model convention are “drafted in general wording, in a sober and technical fashion”—
making the determination of their object and purpose “not an easy task.” In this respect, see
the Federal Court of Appeal decision in MIL Investments, supra note 75, at paragraph 6, stating
that the court was “unable to find . . . an object or purpose” behind article 13(4) of the
Canada-Luxembourg tax treaty that would justify the court’s “departure from the plain words”
of the text.
93 See, for example, van Weeghel and Gunn, supra note 88, at 323, describing the application of
an implicit anti-abuse principle as “rather arbitrary.” As will be explained in the second part of
this article, a similar challenge exists with the “object and purpose” criterion of the PPT.
94 See, for example, Klaus Vogel et al., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions: A Commentary
to the OECD-, UN- and US Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income and
Capital, 3d ed. (London: Kluwer Law International, 1997), article 1, at paragraph 95, stating
that “application of a double taxation convention in accordance with its substance rather than
in accordance with its form should continue to be an exception and that the threshold for
allowing such application should be fixed at a high level rather than a low one.” As will be
discussed in the second part of this article, the threshold for the PPT is much lower, such that
the test applies where “one of the principal purposes” of a transaction or arrangement was to
obtain a treaty benefit.
95 Engelen, supra note 84, at 36. See also van Weeghel, supra note 86, at 258, stating that the
improper use of a tax treaty must have “the sole intention to avoid the tax of one or both
contracting states and must defeat fundamental and enduring expectations and policy objectives
shared by both states and therewith the purpose of a treaty in the broad sense”; and De Broe,
supra note 18, at 320, arguing that because tax treaties provide specific tax benefits in order to
encourage cross-border economic activities, “[i]t would be contrary to the object and purpose
of a tax treaty if a transaction that has a reasonable business justification would be denied treaty
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At the OECD, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs originally rejected the idea of an
implicit general anti-abuse principle, concluding in the 1987 conduit companies
report that the pacta sunt servanda principle requires the contracting states to a tax
treaty to grant treaty benefits “even if considered to be improper,” absent explicit
anti-abuse provisions within the treaty itself.96 For this reason, some treaties include
specific provisions declaring that treaty benefits may be denied where doing otherwise would result in an abuse of the treaty’s provisions.97 Until the MLI, however,
the inclusion of explicit general anti-abuse provisions in tax treaties was “the exception rather than the rule.”98
Despite the OECD’s initial unwillingness to recognize an implicit anti-abuse
principle, that position changed by 2003, as the OECD grew increasingly concerned
that the expanding tax treaty network posed greater risks of abuse,99 and that the
increased use of conduit arrangements could result in the granting of tax treaty
benefits that were not intended by the contracting states.100 Explaining that some
states consider the abuse of a tax treaty to be an abuse of domestic-law provisions
protection because that transaction also permits the taxpayer to alleviate his tax burden,” and
concluding on this basis that transactions or arrangements defeat the object and purpose of a
tax treaty only where they serve “no purpose other than obtaining the tax advantages.”
96 OECD conduit companies report, supra note 18, at paragraph 43.
97 See, for example, article XXIX A(7) of the Canada-US tax treaty, supra note 48, which was
added by the third protocol in 1995, and article 29(6) of the Canada-Germany tax treaty, which
was added in 2001 (Agreement Between Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion and the Assistance in Tax Matters, signed at Berlin on April 19,
2001). In the absence of these provisions, an inference might be drawn that the parties intended
that the treaty would not be subject to a general anti-abuse principle. See, for example,
Nathalie Goyette and Phil D. Halvorson, “Canada,” in International Fiscal Association, Tax
Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of Anti-Avoidance Provisions, Cahiers de droit fiscal
international vol. 95a (The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers, 2010), 171-91, at 185. Indeed, this was the
basis for the Tax Court of Canada’s conclusion in MIL Investments, supra note 17, at
paragraph 87, that the Canada-Luxembourg tax treaty could not be “construed as containing
an inherent anti-abuse rule.”
98 Stef van Weeghel, “General Report,” in Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of AntiAvoidance Provisions, supra note 97, 17-55, at 46.
99 Paragraph 8 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income
and on Capital (Paris: OECD, January 2003)), noting that “the extension of double taxation
conventions increases the risk of abuse by facilitating the use of artificial legal constructions
aimed at securing the benefits of both the tax advantages available under certain domestic law
and the reliefs from tax provided for in double taxation conventions.” This observation appears
in paragraph 55 of the commentary on article 1 of the current OECD model convention,
which, significantly, substitutes the word “arrangements” for the original words “artificial legal
constructions.”
100 Paragraph 11 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra
note 99, stating that “there has been a growing tendency toward the use of conduit companies
to obtain treaty benefits not intended by the Contracting States in their bilateral negotiations.”
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under which taxes are levied,101 while others “consider that a proper construction of
tax conventions allows them to disregard abusive transactions, such as those entered
into with the view to obtaining unintended benefits under the provisions of these
conventions,”102 the revised OECD commentary concluded that both approaches
allow states to deny the benefits of a tax convention “where arrangements that constitute an abuse of the provisions of the convention have been entered into.”103
More generally, the commentary stated, although “it should not be lightly assumed”
that a taxpayer has entered into an abusive transaction or arrangement,
[a] guiding principle is that the benefits of a double taxation convention should not be
available where a main purpose for entering into certain transactions or arrangements
was to secure a more favourable tax position and obtaining that more favourable
treatment in these circumstances would be contrary to the object and purpose of the
relevant provisions.104

With this “guiding principle,” therefore, the OECD accepted the idea of an implicit
general anti-abuse principle that it had rejected several years earlier.
In addition to these statements, the revised OECD commentary contained two
other comments of relevance to the possible application of the guiding principle.
First, the commentary declared that although the principal purpose of double taxation conventions is “to promote, by eliminating international double taxation,
exchanges of goods and services, and the movement of capital and persons,” it is
also a purpose of tax conventions “to prevent tax avoidance and evasion.”105 Second,
the commentary provided two examples of tax-treaty-shopping transactions or
arrangements to which a specific or general anti-abuse provision might be expected
to apply: the first involving “a person (whether or not a resident of a Contracting
State)” who “acts through a legal entity created in a State essentially to obtain treaty
benefits that would not be available directly”; the second involving “an individual

101 Paragraph 9.2 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra
note 99. This language appears in paragraph 58 of the commentary on article 1 of the current
OECD model convention.
102 Paragraph 9.3 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra
note 99. This language appears in paragraph 59 of the commentary on article 1 of the current
OECD model convention.
103 Paragraph 9.4 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra
note 99. This language appears in paragraph 60 of the commentary on article 1 of the current
OECD model convention.
104 Paragraph 9.5 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra
note 99. This language appears in paragraph 61 of the commentary on article 1 of the current
OECD model convention.
105 Paragraph 7 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra
note 99. Similar language appears in paragraph 54 of the commentary on article 1 of the
current OECD model convention, which also states that these purposes are “confirmed” by
the revised preamble to the convention.
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who has in a Contracting State both his permanent home and all his economic
interests, including a substantial shareholding in a company of that State, . . . who,
essentially in order to sell the shares and escape taxation in that State on the capital
gains from the alienation . . . transfers his permanent home to the other Contracting
State, where such gains are subject to little or no tax.”106
Although these revisions to the OECD commentary have been criticized on the
grounds that there is little basis for the claim that a purpose of tax treaties is to
prevent avoidance,107 and that the guiding principle established a low and indeterminate threshold for determining whether a transaction or arrangement was
abusive,108 the changes appear to have had a significant influence on some judicial
106 Paragraph 9 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra
note 99. Identical language appears in paragraph 56 of the commentary on article 1 of the
current OECD model convention.
107 See, for example, De Broe, supra note 18, at 330-37, arguing that this claim has little support
in the provisions of most tax treaties and is inconsistent with the function of tax treaties to
restrict the application of domestic law. See also Brian J. Arnold, “Tax Treaties and Tax
Avoidance: The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model” (2004) 58:6 Bulletin
for International Fiscal Documentation 244-60. Arnold states, ibid., at 249, that “it can be argued
that the purpose of preventing tax avoidance was created out of thin air by the OECD in
2003,” but he notes as well (ibid., at 247) that the exchange-of-information provision of tax
treaties can be useful in combatting tax avoidance as well as tax evasion. Although the OECD
commentary continues to state that a purpose of tax treaties is to prevent avoidance, the
amended preamble language in article 6(1) of the MLI is somewhat different, stating instead
that a CTA is not intended to create opportunities for non-taxation or to reduce taxation
through tax avoidance. In this respect, see De Broe, supra note 18, at 337, arguing that “the
correct view” is that “treaties are not meant to facilitate avoidance.”
108 See, for example, De Broe, supra note 18, at 319-25, arguing that the first component of the
guiding principle requiring a tax motivation to be “a main purpose for entering into certain
transactions or arrangements” is contrary to the principal purpose of tax treaties, which is to
encourage cross-border economic activities through treaty reliefs and benefits. See also Adolfo
Martín Jiménez, “The 2003 Revision of the OECD Commentaries on the Improper Use of
Tax Treaties: A Case for the Declining Effect of the OECD Commentaries?” (2004) 58:1
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 17-30, at 18-19, arguing that the examples of
“abusive” tax treaty shopping in paragraph 9 of the revised OECD commentaries may involve
legitimate tax planning with real substance; and Juan José Zomoza Pérez and Andrés Báez,
“The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model on Tax Treaties and GAARs:
A Mistaken Starting Point,” in Michael Lang, Pasquale Pistone, Josef Schuch, Claus Staringer,
Alfred Storck, and Martin Zagler, eds., Tax Treaties: Building Bridges Between Law and Economics
(Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2010), 129-59, at 155-58, arguing
that the object and purpose component of the guiding principle is “circular” if a purpose of tax
treaties includes the prevention of avoidance, and that the OECD ought to have designed “a
standard that does not rely on the object and purpose of the treaty provisions, but on the
special characteristics of the arrangements,” specifically artificiality. Arnold acknowledges the
“circularity” critique, but he rightly points out that the object and purpose requirement
presumably turns not on a finding of tax motivation, but on the existence of “a more specific
treaty scheme or purpose that is frustrated or abused by the transaction.” Arnold, supra
note 107, at 247. Since many of these criticisms of the OECD’s guiding principle may also be
applied to the PPT, they will be addressed in more detail in the second part of this article.
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decisions involving tax treaty shopping.109 In A Holdings ApS v. Federal Tax Administration,110 where a company resident in Guernsey established a Danish holding
company whose only activity was to own shares of a company resident in Switzerland, the Federal Court of Switzerland relied on an implicit anti-abuse principle to
deny the Danish company the benefit of a withholding tax exemption on dividends
that would otherwise have been available to a resident of Denmark under the
Switzerland-Denmark tax treaty.111 Although the court noted that Denmark recognized an abuse-of-rights concept and that the treaty did not include any reservation
regarding the Swiss anti-abuse decree, suggesting that the treaty benefit might be
denied under domestic law, the decision turns on the recognition of an implicit antiabuse principle in all tax treaties. According to the court, “[b]ecause the prohibition
of abuses is part of the principle of good faith” in international law, “the prohibition of an abuse of rights as regards conventions is . . . recognised . . . without [it]
being necessary to adopt an explicit provision in the respective convention.”112
Likewise, in Yanko-Weiss v. Holon Assessing Office,113 where a company that was
incorporated in Israel moved its place of management to Belgium and became a
resident of Belgium under Belgian tax law, the District Court of Tel Aviv relied on
an implicit anti-abuse principle to dismiss the taxpayer’s argument that the IsraelBelgium tax treaty114 required the Israeli tax authority to extend treaty benefits to
dividends paid to the taxpayer by an Israeli subsidiary even though the company’s
emigration to Belgium was solely tax-motivated.115 According to the court,
[t]ax treaties were not designed, nor can it be said that any such intent existed, whether
they include express provisions or not, for use that will be made of them in a manner
which is not in good faith and in an acceptable manner, or that use can be made of
them which constitutes improper use of provisions set forth and the benefits which
they grant.116

109 See van Weeghel, supra note 98, at 41.
110 (2005), 8 ITLR 536 (Swiss FC).
111 Convention Between the Swiss Confederation and the Kingdom of Denmark for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Net Worth, signed November 23,
1973. For useful discussions of the case, see De Broe, supra note 18, at 445-48; van Weeghel,
supra note 98, at 38; and René Matteotti and Fabian M. Sutter, “Switzerland: Broad vs Narrow
Interpretation of the Beneficial Owner Concept,” in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends, supra
note 40, 51-58, at 51-54.
112 A Holdings ApS, supra note 110, at paragraph 3.4.3.
113 (2007), 10 ITLR 524 (Tel Aviv-Yafo DC).
114 Convention Between the State of Israel and the Kingdom of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, signed at Brussels on July 13, 1972.
115 For useful discussions of the case, see Guy Katz, “Israel,” in Tax Treaties and Tax Avoidance:
Application of Anti-Avoidance Provisions, supra note 97, 407-26, at 417-18; and van Weeghel,
supra note 98, at 37.
116 Yanko-Weiss Holdings, supra note 113, at 544 (also cited in David A. Ward, Access to Tax Treaty
Benefits, Research Report Prepared for the Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of International
Taxation (Ottawa: Department of Finance, September 2008), at 22).
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On the contrary, it concluded:
[T]reaties for the prevention of double taxation to which Israel is a party are to be read
as if they contain limitation on benefit provisions in cases where it is proven that there
exists improper use of a tax treaty, according to standards of the domestic law and
international law.117

In contrast to these judgments, however, other notable tax cases have rejected
the argument that treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements are inherently
abusive. In Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan,118 a public interest organization
challenged a tax department circular confirming that capital gains realized by
Mauritian residents from the alienation of shares of Indian companies were exempt
from Indian tax under article 13 of the India-Mauritius tax treaty.119 The Supreme
Court of India refused to regard tax treaty shopping as an illegal “fraud on the
treaty” on the grounds that developing countries allow treaty shopping to encourage
capital and technology inflows, that treaty shopping may have been intended when
the treaty was entered into, and that the Indian minister of finance had himself
encouraged the use of conduit companies in Mauritius as a way to promote capital
investment into India.120 Two other cases involved residents of the Netherlands who
were sole shareholders of Dutch companies, both of whom emigrated to Belgium
and transferred the effective management of their companies to Belgium shortly
before realizing proceeds from the liquidation or alienation of these companies.121
The Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) rejected the argument advanced by the
Dutch tax authorities that the proceeds should be taxable in the Netherlands on a
reasonable application of the Netherlands-Belgium tax treaty,122 on the ground that
neither the text of the treaty nor extrinsic materials evidencing the intentions of the
contracting states demonstrated that the object and purpose of the treaty would be
117 Yanko-Weiss Holdings, supra note 113, at 545. According to the court, ibid., at 546, “[t]his
approach is in line with the interpretation of the OECD of recent years (since 2003) from its
model convention, although in my opinion, it should have been included even earlier in light of
the language of the provisions of the Vienna Convention and the doctrine of good faith.”
118 (2003), 6 ITLR 233 (India SC).
119 Convention Between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of
Mauritius for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, signed at Port Louis on August 24, 1982.
120 This case is briefly discussed in Aloke J. Majumdar and P.V. Satya Prasad, “India,” in Tax
Treaties and Tax Avoidance: Application of Anti-Avoidance Provisions, supra note 97, 369-88, at
372-73; and van Weeghel, supra note 98, at 38-39.
121 (May 12, 2006), BNB 2007/36c and BNB 2007/42 (Netherlands SC). These cases are briefly
discussed in De Broe, supra note 18, at 412-13.
122 Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Kingdom of Belgium for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income and Capital and the Regulation of Certain Other Fiscal Matters, signed at Brussels on
October 19, 1970.
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frustrated if the proceeds were not taxed in the Netherlands. Like Canada’s Federal
Court of Appeal in MIL Investments,123 the courts in these cases could not identify
any underlying object or purpose in the applicable treaty provision or the treaty as
a whole that would render the transactions or arrangements abusive.

Beneficial Ownership
In addition to domestic anti-avoidance doctrines and statutory general anti-avoidance
rules, and the notion of an implicit anti-abuse principle under international law, the
concept of beneficial ownership has provided another approach for tax authorities
to challenge treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements. Introduced into the
OECD model convention in 1977, the requirement that the recipient of a payment
be its “beneficial owner” determines the eligibility of residents of a contracting state
for the reduction or elimination of source-country withholding taxes on dividends,
interest, and royalties under articles 10, 11, and 12 of the OECD model convention
and corresponding provisions of bilateral tax treaties.124

Origins and Pre-2014 OECD Commentaries
First included in the 1942 tax treaty between Canada and the United States,125 and
added by the 1966 protocol to the 1945 UK-US tax treaty,126 the original purpose of
the “beneficial owner” language appears to have been primarily to ensure that
treaty benefits available for payments to nominees and agents were extended to the
persons on whose behalf these payments were received.127 At the same time, recognition that a resident of one contracting state might deliberately transfer income
123 See supra note 75 and the accompanying text.
124 OECD model convention, article 10(2) (reducing the withholding tax rate on dividends paid to
a beneficial owner who is resident in the other contracting state); article 11(2) (reducing the
withholding tax rate on interest paid to a beneficial owner who is resident in the other
contracting state); and article 12(1) (prohibiting source-country taxation of royalties that are
beneficially owned by a resident of the other contracting state) (introduced in the 1977 OECD
model convention, infra note 129).
125 Convention Between Canada and the United States of America for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Establishment of Rules of Reciprocal Administrative Assistance in the Case of
Income Taxes, signed at Washington, DC on March 4, 1942 (herein referred to as “the 1942
Canada-US tax treaty”).
126 Protocol signed in 1966 amending the Convention Between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of
America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Washington, DC on April 16, 1945 (herein referred to
as “the UK-US tax treaty”). See Vann, supra note 92, at 271; and John F. Avery-Jones et al.,
“The Origins of Concepts and Expressions Used in the OECD Model and Their Adoption by
States” [2006] no. 6 British Tax Review 695-765, at 753-54.
127 Vann, supra note 92, at 273-79. In addition, Vann explains, the concept was used “to ensure
that the reduced rate of tax on subsidiary parent dividends only applied if the subsidiary was a
real subsidiary” that “was genuinely owned long term by the parent.” Ibid., at 271-72.
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rights to a nominee in a third state in order to obtain otherwise unavailable treaty
benefits suggested that the concept could also serve an anti-abuse function to prevent
tax treaty shopping.128 On this basis, the commentary to the 1977 OECD model
convention explained that “the limitation of tax in the State of source is not available
when an intermediary, such as an agent or nominee, is interposed between the
beneficiary and the payer, unless the beneficial owner is a resident of the other
Contracting State.”129
Since opportunities for tax treaty shopping are not limited to nominees and
agents, however, it was not long before the OECD identified the use of other conduit
arrangements as targets to which the beneficial ownership concept might also apply
to deny treaty benefits. According to the OECD conduit companies report, although
the commentary to the model convention mentioned only “the case of a nominee
or agent” when discussing the beneficial owner limitation on treaty benefits for
dividends, interest, and royalties, the concept would also apply to “other cases
where a person enters into contracts or takes over obligations under which he has a
similar function to a nominee or an agent.”130 As a result, the report concluded:
[A] conduit company can normally not be regarded as the beneficial owner if, though
the formal owner of certain assets, it has very narrow powers which render it a mere
fiduciary or an administrator acting on account of the interested parties (most likely
the shareholders of the conduit company).131

Explaining, however, that “it will usually be difficult for the country of source to
show that the conduit company is not the beneficial owner” and that “not even the
country of residence of the conduit company may have the necessary information
regarding the shareholders of the conduit company,” the report added that the
commentary, “apparently in view of these difficulties,” had observed that the treatment of these companies could be determined through bilateral negotiations.132
With this statement in mind, much of the report discussed various tax treaty provisions that might be adopted to prevent the use of conduit companies for tax treaty
shopping.133
128 Ibid., at 281, noting that the “agent/nominee situation could be deliberately contrived,” and
ibid., at 281-96, reviewing discussions at the OECD leading up to the 1977 amendments to the
OECD model convention, infra note 129.
129 Paragraph 12 of the commentary on article 10 of the 1977 OECD model convention:
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Double Taxation Convention
on Income and on Capital (Paris: OECD, 1977).
130 OECD conduit companies report, supra note 18, at paragraph 14(b).
131 Ibid., adding that the fact that a company’s “main function is to hold assets or rights” is “not
itself sufficient” to categorize a company as “a mere intermediary.”
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid., at paragraphs 21-42. These provisions are discussed below under the heading “TreatyBased Specific Anti-Avoidance Rules.” According to Vann, supra note 92, at 298, these
provisions were the “real value” of the report.
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Although the comments in the OECD conduit companies report extending the
scope of the beneficial owner limitation to conduit companies were not included in
the commentary to the OECD model convention when it was revised in 1992,134 they
were adopted as part of the 2003 revisions to the commentary. According to paragraph 12.1 of the 2003 commentary on article 10 addressing the taxation of
dividends,
[w]here an item of income is received by a resident of a Contracting State acting in the
capacity of agent or nominee it would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of
the Convention for the State of source to grant relief or exemption merely on account
of the status of the immediate recipient of the income as a resident of the other Contracting State. The immediate recipient of the income in this situation qualifies as a
resident but no potential double taxation arises as a consequence of that status since
the recipient is not treated as the owner of the income for tax purposes in the State of
residence. It would be equally inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Convention for the State of source to grant relief or exemption where a resident of a
Contracting State, otherwise than through an agency or nominee relationship, simply
acts as a conduit for another person who in fact receives the benefit of the income
concerned. For these reasons, the report from the Committee on Fiscal Affairs entitled
“Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies” concluded that a
conduit company cannot normally be regarded as the beneficial owner if, though the
formal owner, it has, as a practical matter, very narrow powers which render it, in
relation to the income concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on account
of the interested parties.135

Identical language was also added to the commentaries on articles 11 and 12 dealing
with interest and royalties.136
In addition to these paragraphs, the 2003 revisions also included more general
language stating that
[t]he term “beneficial owner” is not used in a narrow technical sense, rather, it should
be understood in its context and in light of the object and purposes of the Convention,

134 Vann, supra note 92, at 298.
135 Paragraph 12.1 of the commentary on article 10 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra
note 99. This language appears in paragraphs 12.2 and 12.3 of the commentary on article 10 of
the current OECD model convention.
136 Paragraph 8.1 of the commentary on article 11 and paragraph 4.1 of the commentary on
article 12 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra note 99. This language appears in
paragraphs 10 and 10.1 of the commentary on article 11, and paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 of the
commentary on article 12 of the current OECD model convention. The text of these
commentaries commences with an introductory sentence stating that “[r]elief or exemption in
respect of an item of income is granted by the State of source to a resident of the other
Contracting State to avoid in whole or in part the double taxation that would otherwise arise
from the concurrent taxation of that income by the State of residence.” Curiously, this sentence
is omitted from the commentary on article 10.
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including avoiding double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion and
avoidance.137

As a result, the revised commentary suggested that the concept of beneficial owner
should not only apply to exclude nominees and agents, but also be broadly interpreted to prevent tax avoidance associated with the use of conduit arrangements
more generally.

Interpretive Options
Since neither the commentary nor the OECD model convention actually defined the
meaning of beneficial owner, the addition of this language to the 1977 OECD
model convention and the 2003 revisions to the commentary created a difficult interpretive challenge.138 On the one hand, it might be argued that the term should
be interpreted according to the domestic-law meaning applied by the relevant
state.139 On the other hand, it could be argued that the OECD model convention
adopted a common-law concept of beneficial ownership as the meaning for treaty
purposes irrespective of the domestic law of the relevant state.140 Alternatively, the
tax treaty meaning of beneficial owner could have a separate “international fiscal
meaning” independent of either the domestic law of the relevant state or commonlaw concepts.141
Although the first approach is arguably consistent with article 3(2) of the OECD
model convention and corresponding provisions of bilateral tax treaties, according
to which a term that is not defined in a tax convention “shall, unless the context
otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of that
State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies,” this rule cannot
apply where the domestic law of the state in question has no concept of beneficial
ownership, as is the case in most civil-law jurisdictions,142 and it is difficult to apply
where domestic law interprets beneficial ownership in different ways for different

137 Paragraph 12 of the commentary on article 10, paragraph 9 of the commentary on article 11,
and paragraph 4 of the commentary on article 12 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra
note 99. This language appears in paragraph 12.1 of the commentary on article 10,
paragraph 9.1 of the commentary on article 11, and paragraph 4 of the commentary on
article 12 of the current OECD model convention.
138 For a useful overview of the various interpretive options, see De Broe, supra note 18, at
662-94.
139 See, for example, H. Pijl, “Beneficial Ownership and Second Tier Beneficial Owners in Tax
Treaties of the Netherlands” (2003) 31:10 Intertax 353-61.
140 See, for example, Charl P. du Toit, Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties
(Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 1999).
141 Philip Baker, Double Taxation Conventions, 3d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell) (looseleaf ), at
section 10B-14.
142 De Broe, supra note 18, at 668.
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purposes, as is the case in at least some common-law jurisdictions.143 Nor is it desirable to apply a domestic-law meaning only for the purposes of taxes imposed by
states with a clear domestic-law meaning of beneficial ownership, since this would
result in different meanings of the term “beneficial owner” in different treaties and
asymmetrical meanings in treaties where one of the contracting states does not
recognize the concept in its domestic law.144 In addition, the OECD commentary
makes no reference to domestic-law meanings of beneficial ownership, and the 2003
revisions to the commentary explicitly state that “the term . . . is not used in a narrow
and technical sense” but “rather . . . should be understood in its context and in light
of the object and purposes of the Convention, including avoiding double taxation
and the prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance.”145 For these reasons, even
where a meaning of the term “beneficial owner” can be determined under the
domestic law of the relevant state, it seems reasonable to conclude that the context
in which the term is used in the OECD model convention and in bilateral tax treaties
based on the model convention requires a meaning other than that under domestic
law.146
The second interpretation, that the OECD model convention adopted a commonlaw concept of beneficial ownership as an independent treaty concept, is also
unconvincing. Although the term “beneficial owner” is itself obviously derived from
common-law legal systems and was originally used in tax treaties between commonlaw jurisdictions, the common-law concept relates to the ownership of assets while
the tax treaty concept concerns entitlement to income, suggesting that these are
different concepts with different meanings.147 This conclusion is also supported by
translations of “beneficial owner” in other tax treaties, including in particular the
official French version of the OECD model convention. Those translations refer not
to ownership at all, but to the “real beneficiary” (“bénéficiaire effectif” in French

143 See, for example, Catherine Brown, “Symposium: Beneficial Ownership and the Income Tax
Act” (2003) 51:1 Canadian Tax Journal 401-53, at 452, concluding that the term “beneficial
ownership” may have “multiple meanings” for tax purposes, which “may change depending on
the provision in issue.” In New Zealand, on the other hand, the concept of beneficial
ownership apparently has a clear meaning under domestic law. Craig Elliffe, “The
Interpretation and Meaning of ‘Beneficial Owner’ in New Zealand” [2009] no. 3 British Tax
Review 276-305.
144 De Broe, supra note 18, at 669-71.
145 See supra note 137 and the accompanying text.
146 See, for example, De Broe, supra note 18, at 672; and Michael N. Kandev, “Tax Treaty
Interpretation: Determining Domestic Meaning Under Article 3(2) of the OECD Model”
(2007) 55:1 Canadian Tax Journal 31-71, at 59-60 and 69.
147 De Broe, supra note 18, at 679. The distinction is most apparent with respect to beneficiaries
of common-law trusts, who are generally understood to be the beneficial owners of the trust
property for common-law purposes but not necessarily the beneficial owners of trust income
for tax treaty purposes. See John Prebble, “Accumulation Trusts and Double Tax Conventions”
[2001] no. 1 British Tax Review 69-82, at 75-80.
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and “beneficario efectivo” in Spanish) or the person who is “entitled to use” (“Nutzungsberechtigter” in German) or “ultimately entitled to” (“Uiteindelijik gerechtigde”
in Dutch) the income.148 Finally, there is nothing in the OECD commentary to suggest that the use of this term in the OECD model convention was intended to be
limited to a common-law meaning, and the 2003 revisions to the commentary emphasize the very opposite—that “the term . . . is not used in a narrow and technical
sense” but “rather . . . should be understood in its context and in light of the object
and purposes of the Convention, including avoiding double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance.”149 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that
two civil-law jurisdictions would deliberately agree to incorporate a common-law
concept into a bilateral tax treaty between them.150 As a result, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the tax treaty concept of beneficial ownership has an “international
fiscal meaning” that is independent not only of the domestic law of the contracting
states but also of any common-law meaning.151
Accepting that the term “beneficial owner” has an autonomous international
fiscal meaning for tax treaty purposes, however, does not determine whether that
meaning should be broadly construed according to the economic substance of
transactions or arrangements, or be more narrowly understood in terms of their
legal character. A broad economic approach is supported by a presumed purpose of
the concept to discourage tax treaty shopping,152 and by statements in the 2003
revised OECD commentary that the term “beneficial owner” is not used “in a narrow
technical sense,”153 does not contemplate a person who “acts as a conduit for another
person who in fact receives the benefit of the income concerned,”154 and would not
normally include a conduit company “if . . . it has, as a practical matter, very narrow
powers . . . in relation to the income concerned.”155 A narrower legal approach is
premised on the original focus in the OECD commentary on agents or nominees,156
on the statement in the 2003 commentary that a conduit company cannot be
regarded as the beneficial owner of income where it has “very narrow powers which
render it, in relation to the income concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting
on account of the interested parties,”157 and on the fact that the 2003 revisions to
the OECD commentary also included several paragraphs identifying treaty-based
148 See du Toit, supra note 140, at 165.
149 See supra note 137 and the accompanying text.
150 De Broe, supra note 18, at 679.
151 Ibid.
152 See, for example, Pijl, supra note 139, at 354-56.
153 See supra note 137 and the accompanying text.
154 See supra note 135 and the accompanying text (emphasis added).
155 Ibid. (emphasis added).
156 See supra note 129 and the accompanying text.
157 See supra note 135 and the accompanying text (emphasis added). See, for example, De Broe,
supra note 18, at 686.
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specific anti-avoidance rules to address conduit arrangements158—which arguably
would be unnecessary if the term “beneficial owner” were broadly construed as an
anti-avoidance concept that can be used to challenge any conduit arrangement.159
Moreover, to the extent that the 2003 revisions to the OECD commentary expanded
the meaning of beneficial owner, it might also be argued that a broad economic
understanding of this term should not apply to tax treaties that were concluded
before these revisions.160 In the absence of any further guidance, however, the
meaning of the tax treaty concept of beneficial ownership was left to the courts.

Judicial Decisions
Perhaps not surprisingly, given varied statements in the OECD commentaries, judicial
decisions following the 2003 revisions have taken different positions on the meaning
of beneficial ownership, with some courts adopting a broad economic approach and
others emphasizing the legal character of the transactions or arrangements at
issue.161 In Indofood International Finance Ltd. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA , London
Branch,162 for example, where the UK courts were called upon to rule on the viability
of a proposed financing arrangement in order to resolve a commercial dispute, the
High Court construed the meaning of the term “beneficial owner” by reference to
158 Paragraphs 13-20 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra
note 99. See the discussion below under the heading “Treaty-Based Specific Anti-Avoidance
Rules.”
159 Adolfo Martín Jiménez, “Beneficial Ownership: Current Trends” (2010) 2:1 World Tax Journal
35-63, at 54.
160 Although opinions differ on the relevance of subsequent OECD commentaries to the
interpretation of treaties concluded before the commentaries were adopted, most commentators
conclude that revisions that exceed mere clarification should not be taken into account. See,
for example, John F. Avery Jones, “The Effect of Changes in the OECD Commentaries After
a Treaty Is Concluded” (2002) 56:3 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 102-9;
Michael Lang and Florian Brugger, “The Role of the OECD Commentary in Tax Treaty
Interpretation” (2008) 23:2 Australian Tax Forum 95-108; and Michael N. Kandev and
Matthew Peters, “Treaty Interpretation: The Concept of ‘Beneficial Owner’ in Canadian Tax
Treaty Theory and Practice,” in Report of Proceedings of the Sixty-Third Tax Conference, 2011
Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2012), 26:1-60. In several cases,
however, courts have been willing to consider the 2003 OECD commentary in interpreting the
meaning of the term “beneficial owner” for the purposes of treaties concluded before 2003.
See, for example, Prévost Car Inc. v. The Queen, 2009 FCA 57; aff’g. 2008 TCC 231, in which
the Federal Court of Appeal stated (at paragraph 11) that “later Commentaries” could be relied
upon to interpret a tax treaty concluded prior to these commentaries “when they represent a
fair interpretation of the words of the Model Convention and do not conflict with
Commentaries in existence at the time a specific treaty was entered and when, of course,
neither treaty partner has registered an objection to the new Commentaries.” This case is
discussed in more detail below—see infra notes 201-211 and the accompanying text.
161 For a comprehensive review of cases in multiple jurisdictions, see Angelika Meindl-Ringer,
Beneficial Ownership in International Tax Law (Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Wolters
Kluwer, 2016), at chapter 5.
162 [2005] EWHC 2103; rev’d. [2006] EWCA Civ. 158.
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legal relationships while the Court of Appeal looked to economic or commercial
substance.163 The facts of the case involved an Indonesian company (“the parent
guarantor”), which borrowed funds in 2002 through a Mauritian finance subsidiary
(“the issuer”) in order to obtain the benefit of the 10 percent withholding tax rate
under the 1996 Indonesia-Mauritius tax treaty.164 When the Indonesian government
terminated the treaty effective January 1, 2005, the issuer invoked an early redemption clause that was available if the treaty was terminated in order to refinance at
lower interest rates prevailing at the time. Since the early redemption option was
available only if there was no reasonable alternative arrangement through which a
10 percent withholding tax rate could be maintained, the lenders argued that early
redemption was prohibited because the debt could be assigned to a new company
resident in the Netherlands (“Newco”), which would be eligible for the same withholding tax rate as the Mauritian subsidiary. The issuer argued that the Indonesian
tax authorities would not recognize Newco as the beneficial owner of the interest
for the purpose of the reduced withholding tax rate under the Indonesia-Netherlands
tax treaty.165 As a result, the UK courts were put in the odd position of having to rule
on how Indonesian law would view the proposed restructuring.
At the High Court, the issuer relied on correspondence in which the Indonesian
tax authorities adopted a broad economic understanding of beneficial ownership,
concluding that they would not regard Newco as the beneficial owner of interest
received from the parent guarantor because “the term ‘beneficial owner’ means the
actual owner of the interest income who truly has the full right to enjoy directly the
benefits of that interest income,” not a “conduit company” such as Newco.166
Rejecting this interpretation, the court adopted a legal conception of beneficial
ownership, concluding that Newco would “not be a nominee or agent for any other
party” or “any sort of trustee or fiduciary.”167 Instead, the court reasoned, since
163 For useful discussions of the case, see De Broe, supra note 18, at 706-13; and Philip Baker,
“United Kingdom: Indofood International Finance Ltd v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA,” in
Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends, supra note 40, 27-38.
164 The Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mauritius and the Government
of the Republic of Indonesia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Jakarta on December 10, 1996.
165 Convention Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Jakarta on January 29, 2002
(herein referred to as “the Indonesia-Netherlands tax treaty”).
166 Indofood, supra note 162 (HC), at paragraph 26.
167 Ibid., at paragraph 46. Although this conclusion might suggest that the court adopted a
domestic-law meaning of beneficial ownership based on the common law of England (which
would have been inappropriate for the task before it—namely, determining how beneficial
ownership would be understood in Indonesia), the court’s references to the OECD conduit
companies report and the OECD commentaries as interpreted by Philip Baker suggest more
strongly that it considered the international fiscal meaning of beneficial ownership to be
indistinguishable from its common-law meaning.
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Newco would “have the power to dispose of the interest when received as it wishes,
although . . . constrained by its contractual obligation . . . to apply the proceeds of
the interest” to the ultimate lenders,168 and any undistributed interest that it received
would be generally available to all its creditors in the event of its insolvency,169 it
followed that Newco would be the beneficial owner of the interest and the reduced
withholding tax rate in the Indonesia-Netherlands tax treaty would apply.170 On this
basis, the High Court found for the lenders.
The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, adopted a broad meaning of beneficial
ownership and allowed the issuer’s appeal on the basis that Newco would not be the
beneficial owner of the interest. Since “the term ‘beneficial owner’ is to be given an
international fiscal meaning not derived from domestic laws of contracting states,”
the court explained, it was “by no means conclusive” that “neither the Issuer nor
Newco was or would be a trustee, agent or nominee . . . in relation to the interest
receivable from the Parent Guarantor.”171 On the contrary, the court continued, the
2003 OECD commentary and observations on that commentary demonstrate that
“the concept of beneficial ownership is incompatible with that of the formal owner
who does not have ‘the full privilege to directly benefit from the income.’ ”172 In
addition, the court explained, since this concept is not limited to a “technical and
legal . . . approach,” it follows that courts should have regard not only to the “legal,
commercial and practical structure” of the arrangement, but also to “the substance
of the matter.”173 On both grounds, therefore, the court concluded that neither the
issuer nor Newco could be regarded as the beneficial owner of the interest, since
the former was and the latter would be “bound to pay” all interest received from the
parent guarantor to the paying agent for the lenders once the interest was received,174
making it “impossible to conceive of any ‘direct benefit’ from the interest payable
by the Parent Guarantor except by funding its liability” to the lenders.175 As a result,
it followed that the assignment of the debt to Newco was not a reasonable alternative
168 Indofood, supra note 162 (HC), at paragraph 46.
169 Ibid., at paragraph 49.
170 The High Court also concluded, ibid., at paragraph 47, that Newco would have earned a profit
on an interest-rate spread that the Netherlands tax authorities would have insisted upon under
domestic “substance and risk” requirements. The Court of Appeal concluded that the High
Court was mistaken on this point, since the “substance and risk” requirement “would be
satisfied by providing Newco with a combination of ‘handling charges’ and paid up equity
capital.” Indofood, supra note 162 (CA), at paragraph 22.
171 Ibid., at paragraph 42.
172 Ibid., citing a circular letter issued by the Indonesian director of general taxes (DTG).
173 Ibid., at paragraphs 43-44.
174 Ibid. Indeed, it was agreed at the appeal hearing that the parent guarantor actually bypassed the
issuer, making payments directly to the paying agent. Ibid., at paragraph 13.
175 Ibid., at paragraph 44, adding that neither the issuer nor Newco had “the ‘full privilege’ needed
to qualify as the beneficial owner of the income, rather the position of Issuer and Newco
equates to that of an ‘administrator of the income.’ ”
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arrangement through which a 10 percent withholding tax rate could be
maintained.176
Although Indofood was a commercial case addressing the meaning of beneficial
ownership in the context of the Indonesia-Netherlands tax treaty, the Court of
Appeal’s conclusion that the term “beneficial owner” has an international fiscal
meaning implies that this meaning would apply to all states, and not only to Indonesia.177 This point was not lost on Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC),
which released draft guidance on the decision that was subsequently incorporated
into the HMRC International Manual.178 The guidance explained that the Court of
Appeal decision was consistent with UK policy and had “simply confirmed” the
position taken in the OECD commentary that
beneficial ownership “should be understood in its context and in light of the object
and purposes of the Convention, including avoiding double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance” and that tests of the legal structure, and of the
commercial and practical substance of the scheme, should be adopted to determine
beneficial ownership.179

The guidance also stated that HMRC would apply this broad international fiscal
meaning in the context of double tax conventions (DTCs) when “the substance of an
arrangement amounts to an improper use of the relevant DTC in the light of the
DTC’s object of prevention of fiscal evasion and avoidance, for example, ‘treaty
shopping.’ ”180 As a result, HMRC affirmed the use of beneficial ownership as an
anti-avoidance concept to address tax treaty shopping.
Tax authorities and courts in other countries have also adopted a broad understanding of beneficial ownership in order to challenge treaty-shopping transactions
or arrangements. In a number of Spanish cases involving payments by the Real
Madrid football team to Hungarian companies for the image rights of various team
members,181 the Audiencia National held that the Hungarian companies were not
the beneficial owners of the royalties on the ground that the concept of beneficial

176 Ibid., at paragraph 59.
177 Baker, supra note 163, at 32.
178 United Kingdom, HM Revenue & Customs, International Manual (London: HMRC),
INTM332050, “Double Taxation Applications and Claims: HMRC Reaction to Indofood
Case” (www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/international-manual/intm332050).
179 Ibid., at paragraph 2.
180 Ibid., at paragraph 4.
181 ( July 18, 2006), JUR\2006\204307, JUR\2007\8915, and JUR\2007\6549; (November 10,
2006), JUR\2006\284679; ( July 20, 2006), JUR\2007\6526; (November 13, 2006),
JUR\2006\284618; and (March 26, 2007), JUR\2007\101877. This summary is based on the
discussion in Adolfo Martín Jiménez, “Beneficial Ownership as a Broad Anti-Avoidance
Provision: Decisions by Spanish Courts and the OECD’s Discussion Draft,” in Beneficial
Ownership: Recent Trends, supra note 40, 127-42, at 128-33.

international tax planning

n

653

ownership is intended to prevent tax treaty shopping and must therefore be given a
broad “economic interpretation” suggested by the 2003 revisions to the OECD commentary.182 Of particular relevance to the decisions were the fact that all but a
small percentage of the royalties (0.5 percent to 2 percent) were paid to companies
resident in Cyprus or the Netherlands when received, and the inference that the
only purpose for interposing the Hungarian companies was to take advantage of
the fact that the tax treaty between Spain and Hungary imposed no withholding tax
on royalties—unlike almost all other Spanish tax treaties at the time.183
Similarly in Denmark, where the tax authorities have denied withholding tax
relief in a large number of cases involving payments to alleged conduit companies,
at least two judgments of the Danish Tax Tribunal have relied on a broad economic
interpretation of beneficial ownership to uphold these assessments.184 In the HHU
case,185 a Jersey company that had acquired the shares of a Danish company transferred the shares to a Swedish holding company structure. The Jersey company
then loaned funds to the Swedish companies, which loaned the funds to the Danish
company. The tribunal held that the Swedish companies were not the beneficial
owners of interest received from the Danish company on the grounds that all moneys
received were automatically paid on to the Jersey company without any tax in
Sweden; that the Swedish companies had no employees, no office or administration,
and no business activities in Sweden; and that the purpose of the arrangement was
to avoid Danish withholding tax.186 The Cook case187 involved a similar structure in
which a Cayman Islands company transferred shares of a Danish company to a
Swedish holding company structure, to which it loaned funds that were re-loaned
to the Danish company. In this case also, the tribunal held that the Swedish companies were not the beneficial owners of interest received from the Danish company
on the grounds that the interest payments were distributed to the Cayman Islands
company without any Swedish tax, and that the holding companies engaged in no
activities other than holding shares of the Danish company.188
Likewise in Switzerland, where the Federal Court relied on an implicit antiabuse principle to challenge tax treaty shopping in A Holdings ApS,189 the courts have
endorsed a broad economic concept of beneficial ownership in order to deny tax
182 Jiménez, supra note 181, at 130.
183 Ibid., at 129.
184 See Jakob Bundgaard, “Danish Case Law Developments on Beneficial Ownership” (2012) 68:1
Tax Notes International 63-74.
185 SKM 2011.57 LSR (Danish Tax Tribunal). The summary of the case presented here is based on
the discussion in Bundgaard, supra note 184, at 67-69.
186 Bundgaard, supra note 184, at 68.
187 SKM 2011.485 LSR (Danish Tax Tribunal). The summary of the case presented here is based
on the discussion in Bundgaard, supra note 184, at 69-70.
188 Bundgaard, supra note 184, at 70.
189 See the discussion of this case in the text above at note 110 and following.
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treaty benefits. In the VSA case,190 two UK companies, one of which was resident in
the Isle of Man, loaned funds to a Luxembourg holding company, which that company used to acquire shares of a Swiss company. The Swiss Tax Appeals Commission
held that dividends paid to the Luxembourg company were not eligible for treaty
benefits under the Switzerland-Luxembourg tax treaty on the grounds that the
Luxembourg company was neither the bénéficiaire nor the bénéficiaire effectif of
the dividend as required by the treaty.191 Concluding that these terms contemplate
“the person who economically enjoys the income and not a conduit company interposed between the debtor of the income and the ultimate recipient,”192 the
commission held that the Luxembourg company did not qualify because the full
amount of the dividends that it received was used to pay interest on the shareholder
loans and some other charges, so that the economic benefit of the income was
enjoyed exclusively by the UK and Manx companies.193
A more recent Swiss case involved a Danish bank that entered into swap agreements with counterparties in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, and hedged against these swap agreements by purchasing shares of
Swiss companies, the total return on which determined the amount of the swap
payments that the Danish bank was obliged to pay to the counterparties.194 Although
the Federal Administrative Court had held that the Danish bank was the beneficial
owner of dividends that it received from the Swiss companies, the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court reversed that decision on the basis that the factual interdependence
of the payments deprived the Danish bank of beneficial ownership. Concluding that

190 (February 28, 2001), 4 ILTS 2002, 191 (Swiss Commission of Appeals in Tax Matters). The
summary of the case presented here is based on the discussion in De Broe, supra note 18, at
702-6.
191 Convention Between the Swiss Confederation and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, signed at Bern
on January 21, 1993. Under article 10(2) of the treaty, dividends were subject to a 5 percent
withholding tax rate if the bénéficiaire effectif of the dividend was a company holding directly
at least 25 percent of the capital of a Swiss company, and were exempt from Swiss withholding
tax altogether if the bénéficiaire held directly for an uninterrupted period of two years
preceding payment of the dividends at least 25 percent of the capital of the Swiss company.
Since the case involved dividend payments in two years and it was not clear that the
Luxembourg subsidiary had held the shares for more than two years in the first of these years,
the decisions addressed the meaning of both terms.
192 Cited in De Broe, supra note 18, at 703.
193 Ibid., at 702.
194 (May 5, 2015), BGE 141 II 447, no. 2C_364/2012 (Swiss Federal Supreme Court). The
summary of the case presented here is based on the discussions in Matteotti and Sutter, supra
note 111, at 55-58; and Stefano Bernasconi and Michael Beusch, “Switzerland: ‘Swap Case’ and
Beneficial Ownership,” in Peter Essers, Eric Kemmeren, Daniël Smit, Michael Lang, Jeffrey
Owens, Pasquale Pistone, Alexander Rust, Josef Schuch, Claus Staringer, and Alfred Storck,
eds., Tax Treaty Case Law Around the Globe 2016 (Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation, 2017), 295-303.
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the key element of beneficial ownership involves “the power of disposal” (Verfügungsberechtigung), which needs to be assessed in accordance with the economic
substance of the transaction or arrangement, taking into account “any legal, contractual or factual limitation” on the use of and benefit from the income as well as
any risks borne by the recipient,195 the court held that the Danish bank was not the
beneficial owner of the dividends because the full amount of the dividends was committed to the counterparties in the form of the swap payments and the Danish bank
did not bear any risk in respect of this income or its share ownership in the Swiss
companies.196
In contrast to these decisions, other cases have adopted a narrower meaning of
the term “beneficial owner,” emphasizing legal rights and relationships rather
than the economic substance of transactions or arrangements. In a decision involving
a UK-resident company that had purchased detached dividend coupons from shares
of the Royal Dutch Oil Company after dividends had been declared but before they
were payable,197 the Hoge Raad held that the UK company was the beneficial owner
of the dividend and was entitled to the reduced withholding tax rate under the
Netherlands-UK tax treaty198 on the grounds that it had free disposal of the coupons
and the dividend income when paid, and that it did not act as an agent (zaakwaarnemer) or for the account of a principal (lasthebber). Although the case did not
involve a conduit arrangement in which a dividend recipient distributed such income
to a third party resident in another state,199 the decision has been interpreted to
stand for the proposition that an entity that is not legally or contractually obliged
to pay specific amounts that it has received to one or more third parties is the beneficial owner of that income.200

195 Bernasconi and Beusch, supra note 194, at 299-300.
196 Ibid., at 300. Interestingly, the court came to this conclusion notwithstanding the absence of an
explicit beneficial owner requirement in the Switzerland-Denmark tax treaty, supra note 111;
the court considered this requirement to be implicit in all Swiss tax treaties.
197 ( June 6, 1994), BNB 1994/217 (Netherlands Supreme Court) (hereinafter referred to as “the
Royal Dutch Oil Company case”). The summary presented here is based on discussions of the
case in De Broe, supra note 18, at 694-97, and Daniël S. Smit, “The Concept of Beneficial
Ownership and Possible Alternative Remedies in Netherlands Case Law,” in Beneficial
Ownership: Recent Trends, supra note 40, 59-89, at 62-65.
198 Convention Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital
Gains, signed at The Hague on November 7, 1980.
199 On this basis, du Toit argues that the case does not provide “unqualified sanctioning for the use
of conduit entities in situations where there is a legal obligation on the conduit entity to pay on
the distributions received.” See du Toit, supra note 140, at 154.
200 See, for example, van Weeghel, supra note 86, at 77.
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In Prévost Car Inc. v. The Queen,201 companies resident in Sweden and the United
Kingdom acquired shares of a Canadian company through a holding company that
they had established in the Netherlands in order to obtain the benefit of a lower
withholding tax rate on dividends from the Canadian company. The Tax Court of
Canada adopted a similar legal understanding of beneficial ownership to that outlined above, to conclude that the Dutch holding company (“PHBV”) was the
beneficial owner of dividends that it received from the Canadian company—even
though the Dutch company had no physical office or employees in the Netherlands
or elsewhere, and it distributed most of the dividend income to its parent companies
in accordance with a shareholders’ agreement entered into between the two parent
companies.202 Rejecting the Crown’s argument that the term “beneficial owner”
should be given a broad international fiscal meaning, looking “behind the legal
relationships in order to identify the person who, as a matter of fact, can ultimately
benefit from the dividends,”203 the court relied on domestic law and the OECD commentaries to conclude that “the ‘beneficial owner’ of dividends is the person who
receives the dividends for his or her own use and enjoyment and assumes the risk
and control of the dividend he or she received.”204 According to the court,

201 Prévost Car, supra note 160 (TCC).
202 For a useful discussion of the case, see Brian J. Arnold, “The Concept of Beneficial Ownership
Under Canada’s Tax Treaties,” in Beneficial Ownership: Recent Trends, supra note 40, 39-49, at
40-43. Arnold concludes, ibid., at 43, that the decision “makes sense in policy and practical
terms” since Canada’s treaty negotiators “knew or should have known” when they agreed, in a
1993 protocol to the Canada-Netherlands tax treaty, to a reduced withholding tax rate on
dividends that the lower rate “would make Netherlands holding companies attractive as
vehicles for holding investments in Canadian companies” and yet “did not insist on the
inclusion of a limitation-on-benefit provision or other protection against treaty shopping
through the use of Netherlands holding companies.” (See the Convention Between Canada
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at The Hague on May 27, 1986, as
amended by the protocols signed on March 14, 1993 and August 25, 1997 [herein referred to
as “the Canada-Netherlands tax treaty”].) Although Arnold’s conclusion suggests that the
arrangement, though clearly tax treaty shopping, was not abusive, it does not address the
meaning of the term “beneficial owner.”
203 Prévost Car, supra note 160 (TCC), at paragraph 84. The Crown’s argument turned mainly on
the official translations of the term “beneficial owner” in French and Dutch, which, it argued,
strongly suggested a factual determination. Ibid., at paragraphs 78 and 82.
204 Ibid., at paragraph 100. Although the court (mistakenly in my view) stated that article 3(2) of
the Canada-Netherlands tax treaty (supra note 202) required it “to look to a domestic solution
in interpreting ‘beneficial owner’,” it added that the OECD commentaries were “also relevant”
and considered both common-law and civil-law conceptions of beneficial ownership under
domestic law. Ibid., at paragraphs 95 and 97-98. As a result, as the Federal Court of Appeal
concluded, the decision was based not solely on the domestic-law meaning of “beneficial
owner” nor on a common-law understanding of this term, but on “general, technical and legal
meanings,” including those expressed in the OECD commentaries and the OECD conduit
companies report. See infra note 210 and the accompanying text.

international tax planning

n

657

[t]he person who is [the] beneficial owner of the dividend is the person who enjoys and
assumes all the attributes of ownership. In short the dividend is for the owner’s own
benefit and this person is not accountable to anyone for how he or she deals with the
dividend income. . . . It is the true owner of the property who is the beneficial owner
of the property. Where an agency or mandate exists or the property is in the name of
a nominee, one looks to find on whose behalf the agent or mandatary is acting or for
whom the nominee has lent his or her name. When corporate entities are concerned,
one does not pierce the corporate veil unless the corporation is a conduit for another
person and has absolutely no discretion as to the use or application of funds put
through it as conduit, or has agreed to act on someone else’s behalf pursuant to that
person’s instructions without any right to do other than what that person instructs it, for
example, a stockbroker who is the registered owner of the shares it holds for clients.205

Since the shareholders’ agreement bound only the parent companies and not
PHBV,206 which had to declare and pay dividends in accordance with Dutch law,207
the court concluded that there was “no predetermined and automatic flow of funds”
to the parent companies,208 and that the dividends became property of PHBV that
was generally available to the holding company’s creditors and available for its use
as it wished.209
On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the argument that the Tax
Court had erroneously adopted a purely common-law conception of beneficial
ownership, concluding that the judge’s interpretation “captures the essence of the
concepts of ‘beneficial owner,’ ‘bénéficiaire effectif ’ as it emerges from the review of
the general, technical and legal meanings of the terms” and “accords with what is
stated in the OECD Commentaries and in the Conduit Companies Report.”210 It
also rejected the Crown’s argument that “beneficial owner” means “the person who
can, in fact, ultimately benefit from the dividend,” on the grounds that this
definition
does not appear anywhere in the OECD documents and the very use of the word “can”
opens up a myriad of possibilities which would jeopardize the relative degree of
certainty and stability that a tax treaty seeks to achieve.211

205 Prévost Car, supra note 160 (TCC), at paragraph 100.
206 Ibid., at paragraph 103.
207 Ibid., at paragraph 104.
208 Ibid., at paragraph 102.
209 Ibid., at paragraph 105.
210 Prévost Car, supra note 160 (FCA), at paragraph 14.
211 Ibid., at paragraph 15, adding that “[t]he Crown . . . is asking the Court to adopt a pejorative
view of holding companies which neither Canadian domestic law, the international community
nor the Canadian government through the process of objection, have adopted.”

658

n

canadian tax journal / revue fiscale canadienne

(2018) 66:3

In Velcro Canada Inc. v. The Queen,212 the Tax Court of Canada held that a holding
company resident in the Netherlands was the beneficial owner of royalties received
under a licence agreement that its parent company assigned to it immediately after
moving its residence from the Netherlands to the Netherlands Antilles, even
though the holding company was contractually obliged to pay 90 percent of all
amounts received to the parent.213 Rejecting the Crown’s argument that this contractual obligation deprived the holding company of the “use and enjoyment” of the
royalties,214 the court held that there was no “automatic” or “predetermined flow of
funds”215 because royalties were received in Canadian dollars and converted into
Dutch or US funds;216 the royalties were not segregated from the holding company’s
other funds;217 the holding company had 30 days before it had to make payments to
its parent;218 and the agreement allowed the holding company to retain 10 percent
of the royalties that it received.219 For these reasons, the court concluded, the holding company was not “a mere agent, nominee or conduit” with no discretion as to
the use or application of the royalties220 but had possession, use, and control of this
income,221 and assumed risks in relation to the royalties, which were available to
creditors and were subject to currency fluctuations.222

2014 Revisions to the OECD Commentary
Given the differing judicial opinions on the meaning of beneficial owner, and the
uncertainty created by these differences, it is not surprising that several commentators
began to call upon the OECD to clarify the meaning of the term,223 or that the OECD
took up this task in the spring of 2011 when it released a discussion draft containing
212 2012 TCC 57.
213 For a useful discussion of the case, see Arnold, supra note 202, at 44-48.
214 Velcro, supra note 212, at paragraph 28.
215 Ibid., at paragraphs 28 and 45.
216 Ibid., at paragraph 40.
217 Ibid., at paragraph 33.
218 Ibid., at paragraph 28.
219 Ibid., at paragraph 43. Since the withholding tax rate on royalties was 10 percent under the
Canada-Netherlands tax treaty for some of the years at issue, Arnold concludes that the legal
obligation to pay 90 percent of royalties received effectively meant that the holding company
was required to pay all after-tax income to the parent. Arnold, supra note 202, at 47. This
conclusion, however, is not clear from the facts, and would not apply to some of the years at
issue during which royalties were exempt from withholding tax in Canada.
220 Velcro, supra note 212, at paragraph 51.
221 Ibid., at paragraphs 35, 37-38, and 42.
222 Ibid., at paragraph 40.
223 See, for example, Jinyan Li, “Beneficial Ownership in Tax Treaties: Judicial Interpretation and
the Case for Clarity,” in Philip Baker and Catherine Bobbett, eds., Tax Polymath: A Life in
International Taxation (Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2010),
187-209, at 206-9.
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proposed revisions to the OECD commentary.224 Adopted with some modifications
in 2014, these revisions include five important statements on the meaning of the
term “beneficial owner.”
First, the 2014 revisions explain, since the term “beneficial owner” was added to
the OECD model convention to address potential uncertainties in the application of
articles 10, 11, and 12 to the payment of dividends, interest, and royalties to intermediaries, it was not intended to refer to “any technical meaning that it could have
under the domestic law of a specific country,” nor was it “used in a narrow technical
sense (such as the meaning that it has under the trust law of many common law
countries),” but it was “intended to be interpreted in this context . . . and in light of
the object and purposes of the Convention.”225 In other words, as argued earlier,226
the term was always intended to have an international fiscal meaning independent
of the domestic law of a specific state and any common-law meaning.
Second, the revised commentary notes, in each of the examples in which the
direct recipient of a payment is not regarded as its beneficial owner (that is, an
agent, a nominee, and a conduit company acting as a fiduciary or administrator), the
recipient’s “right to use and enjoy the dividend” is “constrained by a contractual or
legal obligation to pass on the payment received to another person.”227 In this
respect, the revised commentary rejects the broad economic meaning of beneficial
owner adopted in several judicial decisions,228 affirming instead the narrower legal
understanding of the term applied in Prévost Car 229 and in the Royal Dutch Oil
Company case.230
Third, the revised commentary continues, the existence of a contractual or legal
obligation to pass on a payment received to another person
will normally derive from relevant legal documents but may also be found to exist on
the basis of facts and circumstances showing that, in substance, the recipient clearly

224 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Clarification of the Meaning of
“Beneficial Owner” in the OECD Model Tax Convention: Discussion Draft (Paris: OECD, April 29,
2011).
225 Paragraphs 12 and 12.1 of the commentary on article 10, paragraphs 9 and 9.1 of the
commentary on article 11, and paragraph 4 of the commentary on article 12 of the OECD
model convention (introduced in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version 2014 (Paris: OECD, July
2014)).
226 Supra notes 138-151 and the accompanying text.
227 Paragraph 12.4 of the commentary on article 10, paragraph 10.2 of the commentary on
article 11, and paragraph 4.3 of the commentary on article 12 of the OECD model convention.
228 See the cases discussed at supra notes 162-196 and the accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 201-211 and the accompanying text.
230 Supra notes 197-211 and the accompanying text. For a similar conclusion, see Robert J. Danon,
“Treaty Abuse in the Post-BEPS World: An Analysis of the Policy Shift and Impact of the
Principal Purpose Test for MNE Groups” (2018) 72:1 Bulletin for International Taxation 31-55,
at 34-35.
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does not have the right to use and enjoy the dividend unconstrained by a contractual
or legal obligation to pass on the payment received to another person.231

Although the test for determining beneficial ownership remains whether or not the
recipient has a contractual or legal obligation to pass on the payment to another
person, therefore, evidence of this obligation may be derived not only from “relevant
legal documents” but also from the “facts and circumstances” of the transactions or
arrangements.232
Fourth, the revised commentary adds, a contractual or legal obligation to pass on
a payment received to another person “would not include contractual or legal obligations that are not dependent on the receipt of the payment by the direct
recipient”—for example,
an obligation that is not dependent on the receipt of the payment and which the direct
recipient has as a debtor or as a party to financial transactions, or typical distribution
obligations of pension schemes and of collective investment vehicles entitled to treaty
benefits.233

As a result, the kind of legal or contractual obligation to pass on a payment that
would deprive the direct recipient of a payment of recognition as its beneficial
owner is not any contractual or legal obligation that happens to be financed by the
payment as a factual matter (a relationship of factual dependence), but a contractual or legal obligation that is contractually or legally dependent on the receipt of
the payment by the direct recipient (a relationship of contractual or legal dependence). Although this dependence clearly existed in Velcro 234 and may have existed
in many of the cases decided under a broader economic interpretation of the term
beneficial owner,235 it was not the case in Prévost Car,236 where the shareholders’

231 Paragraph 12.4 of the commentary on article 10, paragraph 10.2 of the commentary on
article 11, and paragraph 4.3 of the commentary on article 12 of the OECD model convention.
232 For this reason, the reference to the “substance” of the recipient’s right should not be read to
invite the kind of broad economic analysis that an emphasis on contractual or legal obligations
denies. For a similar conclusion, see Danon, supra note 230, at 35.
233 Paragraph 12.4 of the commentary on article 10, paragraph 10.2 of the commentary on
article 11, and paragraph 4.3 of the commentary on article 12 of the OECD model convention.
234 Velcro, supra note 212.
235 See the cases discussed in the text above at notes 162-198. In particular, see Indofood, supra
note 162, where the Court of Appeal held that Newco would be “bound to pay” all interest
received from the parent guarantor to the paying agent for the lenders once the interest was
received, and the Spanish cases involving payments by the Real Madrid soccer team to
Hungarian companies, supra note 180, where all but a very small percentage of the royalties
were paid on to companies in other states. According to Jiménez, for example, the Audiencia
National “could have reached the same conclusion by simply analysing the legal position of the
Hungarian companies and without assimilating the concept of beneficial ownership to a broad
anti-abuse provision.” Jiménez, supra note 180, at 132. Similarly, Baker notes that the facts in
(Notes 235 and 236 are continued on page 661.)
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agreement between the parent companies was not contractually or legally binding
on the holding company. Nor is it likely that this test would be satisfied for payments
under the swap agreements in the Swiss swap case,237 which were factually dependent on dividends that the Danish bank received from Swiss companies once it had
hedged its position by purchasing shares, but presumably were not contractually or
legally dependent on those payments. For this reason, as several commentators have
observed, the revised commentary narrows the scope of the beneficial ownership
requirement as a mechanism to challenge tax treaty shopping.238
Indeed, the limited scope of beneficial ownership as an anti-abuse concept is
suggested by the fifth revision to the commentary, which emphasizes that treaty
benefits under article 10, 11, or 12 need not “automatically be granted” under these
provisions even if the recipient of a dividend, interest, or royalty payment is a beneficial owner of the payment.239 On the contrary, the revised text of the commentary
states:
Whilst the concept of “beneficial owner” deals with some forms of tax avoidance (i.e.
those involving the interposition of a recipient who is obliged to pass on the dividend
to someone else), it does not deal with other cases of abuses, such as certain forms of
treaty shopping . . . and must not, therefore, be considered as restricting in any way
the application of other approaches to addressing such cases.240

As the current version of the OECD commentary confirms, these “other approaches”
to address tax-treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements include LOB provisions
and the PPT.241 The use of such measures in tax treaties is discussed in the text that
follows.

Treaty-Based Specific Anti-Avoidance Rules
A more targeted approach to tax treaty shopping involves the negotiation of specific
anti-avoidance rules to be included in tax treaties. In order to discourage taxmotivated emigration, for example, tax treaties may include provisions permitting
source taxation of capital gains from the alienation of property by former residents,

Indofood were “very extreme” since Newco “would have had no function other than to receive
and pay on interest.” Baker, supra note 163, at 32.
236 Prévost Car, supra note 160.
237 Supra note 194.
238 See, for example, Danon, supra note 230, at 35, concluding that “beneficial ownership is of
very limited use in conduit situations.”
239 Paragraph 12.5 of the commentary on article 10, paragraph 10.3 of the commentary on
article 11, and paragraph 4.4 of the commentary on article 12 of the OECD model convention.
240 Ibid.
241 Ibid., referring to article 29 of the OECD model convention, which includes the framework for
a LOB provision and the PPT.
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which often supplement domestic exit tax provisions.242 In order to discourage the
use of conduit arrangements, tax treaties may include one or more of the following
measures:
n

n

“lookthrough” provisions that deny treaty benefits to a company resident in
a contracting state to the extent that the company is not owned directly or
indirectly by residents of that state;243
“exclusion” provisions denying treaty benefits to companies enjoying special
tax privileges;244

242 See, for example, article 13(9) of the Canada-UK tax treaty, which preserves “the right of a
Contracting State to levy according to its law a tax on or in respect of gains from the alienation
of any property on a person who is a resident of that State at any time during the fiscal year in
which the property is alienated, or has been so resident at any time during the six years
immediately preceding the alienation of the property.” Convention Between the Government
of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, signed at London on September 8, 1978, as amended by
the protocols signed on April 15, 1980, October 16, 1985, May 7, 2003, and July 21, 2014.
243 See, for example, article 2 of the protocol to the Belgium-Spain tax treaty (Convention
Between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of Spain for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion and Tax Frauds with Respect to Taxes on
Income and on Capital, signed at Brussels on June 14, 1995, with protocol), which provides,
“notwithstanding the provisions of Arts. 10-13, that the source State shall not provide relief if
dividends, interest, royalties or capital gains are derived by a company which is a resident of the
other Contracting State, where persons who are not residents of that other State hold, directly
or indirectly, more than 50% of the capital of that company.” De Broe, supra note 18, at 736.
These provisions (which appear to be based, in part, on the German anti-treaty-shopping
provision discussed above in the text accompanying note 28) are discussed in the OECD
conduit companies report, supra note 18, at paragraphs 23-24, and were incorporated into
paragraph 14 of the commentary on article 1 in the 1992 update to the OECD model
convention (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Model Tax Convention
on Income and on Capital (Paris: OECD, July 23, 1992)). That paragraph was deleted from the
OECD commentary in 2017.
244 See, for example, article 26(3) of Canada-Finland tax treaty, which excludes from the
application of the treaty “any company, trust or other entity that is a resident of a Contracting
State and is beneficially owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more persons
who are not residents of that State, if the amount of the tax imposed on the income or capital
of the company, trust or other entity by that State (after taking into account any reduction or
offset of the amount of tax in any manner, including a refund, reimbursement, contribution,
credit or allowance to the company, trust, or other entity or to any other person) is substantially
lower than the amount that would be imposed by that State if all of the shares of the capital
stock of the company or all of the interests in the trust or other entity, as the case may be, were
beneficially owned by one or more individuals who were residents of that State.” Convention
Between Canada and Finland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Helsinki on July 20, 2006. This
“exclusion approach” is discussed in the OECD conduit companies report, supra note 18, at
paragraphs 26-28, and was incorporated into paragraphs 21-21.2 of the commentary on

international tax planning
n

n

n

n

n

663

“subject-to-tax” provisions that grant source-state treaty benefits only for
income that is subject to tax in the residence state;245
“channel” provisions that deny treaty benefits for income received by a company resident in the other contracting state that is used primarily to satisfy
claims of one or more persons not resident in that state who have a substantial
interest in the company and exercise control of the company;246
detailed LOB provisions that limit treaty benefits to specific persons or categories of income;247 and
purpose tests that deny some or all treaty benefits where the main purpose or
one of the main purposes of the transaction or arrangement that would otherwise result in a treaty benefit was to obtain the benefit.248

article 1 in the 1992 update to the OECD model convention, supra note 243. A greatly
expanded discussion of tax treaty provisions to address “special tax regimes” now appears in
paragraphs 85-100 of the 2017 OECD commentary.
245 See, for example, article 27(2) of the Canada-UK tax treaty, supra note 242, which limits treaty
relief for persons subject to tax on a remittance basis “only to so much of the income as is taxed
in the other Contracting State.” Another example of this subject-to-tax approach is found in
anti-abuse rules for income attributed to a permanent establishment in a low-tax jurisdiction
that is exempt from tax in the residence state. See, for example, article 29(8) of the Convention
Between Canada and France for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, signed at Paris on May 2,
1975, as amended by the protocols signed on January 16, 1987, November 30, 1995, and
February 2, 2010; and article 10 of the MLI, which will be discussed in the second part of this
article. This “subject-to-tax” approach was discussed in the OECD conduit companies report,
supra note 18, at paragraphs 29-36, and incorporated into paragraphs 15-16 of the commentary
on article 1 in the 1992 update to the OECD model convention, supra note 243. These
paragraphs were deleted from the OECD commentary in 2017.
246 See, for example, article 22 of the Belgium-Switzerland tax treaty, which incorporates the Swiss
anti-abuse decree discussed above in the text accompanying note 28 (Convention Between the
Swiss Confederation and the Kingdom of Belgium for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, signed at Bern on August 28, 1978). See De Broe,
supra note 18, at 732-34. This “channel” approach was discussed in the OECD conduit
companies report, supra note 18, at paragraphs 37-41, and was incorporated into paragraphs
17-18 of the commentary on article 1 in the 1992 update to the OECD model convention,
supra note 243. These paragraphs were deleted from the OECD commentary in 2017.
247 See, for example, article XXIX A of the Canada-US tax treaty, supra note 48. A discussion of
this approach to tax treaty shopping was first added in paragraph 20 of the commentary on
article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra note 99. With the addition of a detailed
LOB provision to the OECD model convention in 2017, that discussion was deleted from the
commentary on article 1 and replaced with commentary on new article 29.
248 See, for example, articles 10(8), 11(9), and 12(8) of the Canada-UK tax treaty, supra note 242.
A discussion of this approach to tax treaty shopping was first added in paragraph 21.4 of the
commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra note 99. With the
addition of the PPT to the OECD model convention in 2017, that discussion was deleted from
the commentary on article 1 and replaced with commentary on new article 29(9).
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Although these specific anti-avoidance rules appear in many tax treaties,249 the
most important of these provisions in the context of the MLI and the PPT are detailed
LOB provisions and purpose tests. The former form the basis for the “simplified
limitation-on-benefit” (SLOB) provisions in articles 7(8) through (13) of the MLI and
the framework for detailed LOB provisions in articles 29(1) through (7) of the 2017
OECD model convention; the latter are incorporated into the PPT in article 7(1) of
the MLI and article 29(9) of the 2017 OECD model convention, which applies in
place of or in the absence of these purpose tests in CTA s.

Detailed LOB Provisions
First included in the OECD commentary in 2003250 and added to the OECD model
convention in 2017,251 detailed LOB provisions were originally developed in the
United States, which has had policy concerns about tax treaty shopping dating back
to at least the 1980s.252 Although early versions of these LOB provisions contained
relatively simple lookthrough elements as well as purpose tests,253 the provisions
became more detailed over time as US treaty negotiators devised a growing number
of objective criteria to preclude treaty-shopping transactions or arrangements.254
The 1989 US-Germany tax treaty was the first US treaty to contain a detailed LOB
provision.255 Since then, the United States has generally insisted on including a
detailed LOB provision in all its tax treaties.256 These LOB provisions usually operate
on a reciprocal basis; however, the provision that was added to the Canada-US tax
treaty by the third protocol in 1995 initially applied only to US treaty benefits, and
was extended to Canadian treaty benefits only after the signing of the fifth protocol
in 2007.

249 For a brief summary of International Fiscal Association branch reports on specific antiavoidance provisions in tax treaties, see van Weeghel, supra note 98, at 47-53.
250 Paragraph 20 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention.
251 Articles 29(1) through (7) of the OECD model convention.
252 Anna A. Kornikova, “Solving the Problem of Tax-Treaty Shopping Through the Use of
Limitation on Benefit Provisions” (2008) 8:2 Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business
249-86, at 279.
253 Ibid., at 279-80. See also the discussion of early US approaches in Rosenbloom, supra note 15,
at 779-810.
254 Patricia A. Brown, “Policy Forum: What Makes a Dutch Company Dutch? The Evolution of
US Limitation-on-Benefit Provisions” (2014) 62:3 Canadian Tax Journal 741-52.
255 Convention Between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes, signed at Bonn on August 29, 1989
(herein referred to as “the US-Germany tax treaty”), article 28. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and
Christiana Hji Panayi, “Rethinking Treaty Shopping: Lessons for the European Union,” in Tax
Treaties: Building Bridges Between Law and Economics, supra note 108, 21-50, at 42.
256 J. Clifton Fleming Jr., “Searching for the Uncertain Rationale Underlying the US Treasury’s
Anti-Treaty Shopping Policy” (2012) 40:4 Intertax 245-53.
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Even though most US tax treaties concluded since the early 1990s contain detailed

LOB provisions, it was only in 2006 that these provisions were added to the US model

income tax convention.257 The more recent 2016 US model income tax convention
contains even more detailed LOB provisions that expand upon the provisions in the
2006 model convention.258 Although the final report on BEPS action 6 was completed before the final 2016 model convention was released, the LOB provisions in
the 2016 model form the basis for the SLOB provisions in the MLI and the framework
for detailed LOB provisions in articles 29(1) through (7) of the 2017 OECD model
convention. In general terms, these provisions limit treaty benefits to specific
types of persons resident in a contracting state and specific kinds of income received
by residents of a contracting state.
Beginning with article 22(1) of the 2016 US model convention, the first limitation
on treaty benefits provides that these benefits are, except as otherwise provided in
article 22 and a few other treaty provisions, granted only to residents of a contracting
state who are “qualified person[s].”259 For this purpose, article 22(2) generally defines
a qualified person as
1. an individual;260
2. a contracting state or political subdivision or local authority;261
3. a company if the principal class of its shares (and any disproportionate class)
is regularly traded on one or more recognized stock exchanges, and either its
principal class of shares is primarily traded on more or more recognized
stock exchanges of the contracting state of which it is a resident, or its primary
place of management and control is in the contracting state of which it is a
resident;262

257 United States, Department of the Treasury, United States Model Income Tax Convention of
November 15, 2006, at article 22 (herein referred to as “the 2006 US model convention”)
(www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp16801.pdf ).
258 United States, Department of the Treasury, United States Model Income Tax Convention,
February 17, 2016, at article 22 (herein referred to as “the 2016 US model convention”) (www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-us%20Model-2016.pdf ).
259 Ibid., at article 22(1).
260 Ibid., at article 22(2)(a).
261 Ibid., at article 22(2)(b).
262 Ibid., at article 22(2)(c). The term “principal class of shares” is generally defined as “the
ordinary or common shares of the company” provided that the class represents a majority of
the company’s aggregate votes and value. Ibid., at article 22(7)(b). The term “disproportionate
class of shares” is generally defined as “any class of shares of a company, or in the case of a
trust, any class of beneficial interests in such trust, resident in one of the Contracting States
that entitles the shareholder to disproportionately higher participation, through dividends,
redemption payments or otherwise, in the earnings generated in the other Contracting State.”
Ibid., at article 22(7)(c).
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4. a company that satisfies a two-part ownership and base erosion test, generally requiring that
a. at least 50 percent of the aggregate vote and value of its shares (and any
disproportionate class) is owned directly or indirectly by five or fewer
companies entitled to benefits under category (3),263 and
b. less than 50 percent of the company’s gross income is paid, directly or
indirectly, in the form of deductible payments to persons other than qualified persons under category (1), (2), (3), or (5), or connected persons
benefiting from a special tax regime or notional deductions;264
5. a pension fund or charitable organization, provided that in the case of a pension fund operated to administer pension or retirement benefits, more than
50 percent of its beneficiaries, members, or participants are resident in either
contracting state, and in the case of a pension fund operated to earn income
for an exempt entity that administers pension or retirement benefits, the
earnings benefit exclusively or almost exclusively pension funds more than
50 percent of the beneficiaries, members, or participants of which are resident
in either contracting state;265 or
6. a person other than an individual that satisfies a two-part ownership and base
erosion test generally requiring that
a. shares or other beneficial interests (including any disproportionate class)
representing at least 50 percent of the aggregate votes and value of the
shares or beneficial interests are owned, directly or indirectly, by qualified
persons of the contracting state under category (1), (2), (3), or (5),266 and
b. less than 50 percent of the person’s gross income for the taxable year is
paid, directly or indirectly, in the form of deductible payments to persons
other than qualified persons under category (1), (2), (3), or (5), or connected
persons benefiting from a special tax regime or notional deductions.267
Incorporating lookthrough elements in categories 4, 5, and 6, and a channel approach
in the form of the base erosion tests in categories 4 and 6, this provision is designed
to limit treaty benefits to residents of a contracting state with a substantive economic connection to that state.268

263 Ibid., at article 22(2)(d)(i). Where ownership is indirect, the provision also requires each
intermediate owner to be a resident of the contracting state from which the benefit is being
sought, or a “qualifying intermediate owner” as defined in article 22(7)(f ), ibid.
264 Ibid., at article 22(2)(d)(i).
265 Ibid., at article 22(2)(e). Where ownership is indirect, the provision also requires each
intermediate owner to be a “qualified intermediate owner” as defined in article 7(f ).
266 Ibid., at article 22(2)(f )(i).
267 Ibid., at article 22(2)(f )(ii).
268 Kornikova, supra note 252, at 281, referring to comparable provisions in the 2006 US model
convention.
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In addition to these provisions, article 22(3) grants treaty benefits for items of
income that are derived by a resident of a contracting state from the other state if
the resident is engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business in the first state
and the income derived from the other state emanates from or is incidental to that
trade or business.269 Article 22(5) further extends treaty benefits to dividends and
interest paid by members of a multinational corporate group to a company resident
in a contracting state “that functions as a headquarters company for a multinational
corporate group.”270 Thus, through these provisions as well, the US LOB provisions
extend specific treaty benefits to residents with a significant economic connection
with a contracting state, even if they are not qualified persons.
Finally, the 2016 US model convention includes two other provisions that also
grant treaty benefits to residents other than qualified persons. The first is a derivative benefits provision, which grants treaty benefits to a company at least 95 percent
of the aggregate votes and value of which is owned by seven or fewer persons who
are “equivalent beneficiaries” entitled to the same or more advantageous treaty
benefits under a tax treaty between their state and the source state, provided that
less than 50 percent of the company’s gross income is paid in the form of deductible
payments to persons who are not equivalent beneficiaries or persons who are
equivalent beneficiaries under specific circumstances.271 The second provision
allows the competent authority of a contracting state to grant treaty benefits to a
resident of the other state either generally or with respect to a specific item of
income, “taking into account the object and purpose of this Convention,” if the
resident “demonstrates to the satisfaction of such competent authority a substantial
nontax nexus to its Contracting State of residence and that neither its establishment, acquisition or maintenance, nor the conduct of its operations had as one of
its principal purposes the obtaining of benefits under this Convention.”272 Since the
first of these provisions grants treaty benefits to an entity if the same or more
advantageous treaty benefits would be available to its owners or most recipients of
deductible payments under another tax treaty, and the second provision grants
treaty benefits where the resident demonstrates a “substantial nontax nexus” to the
residence state and also demonstrates that one of the principal purposes of its establishment, acquisition, or maintenance was not to obtain benefits under the

269 2016 US model convention, supra note 258, at article 22(3)(a). Where the resident of one
contracting state derives an item of income from a trade or business activity conducted by the
resident in the other state, or derives an item of income arising in the other state from a related
person, article 22(3)(b) further provides that the test in article 22(3)(a) is considered to be
satisfied with respect to the item of income “only if the trade or business activity carried on by
the resident in the first-mentioned Contracting State is substantial in relation to the trade or
business activity carried on by the resident or such person in the other Contracting State.”
270 Ibid., at article 22(5).
271 Ibid., at article 22(4).
272 Ibid., at article 22(6).
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convention, these provisions extend treaty benefits to circumstances in which entitlement to these benefits does not result from abusive tax treaty shopping.

Purpose Tests
In addition to, or instead of, detailed LOB provisions, many tax treaties include purpose tests that deny some or all treaty benefits where “the main purpose or one of
the main purposes” of the transaction or arrangement that would otherwise result
in a treaty benefit was to obtain that benefit. Although subjective intention-based
anti-abuse provisions were included in the 1942 Canada-US tax treaty and the 1945
UK-US tax treaty as a way to limit entitlement to the lower withholding tax rate on
dividends paid to a parent corporation,273 the words “the main purpose or one of the
main purposes” appear to have originated in the United Kingdom, where the same
language is used in many domestic anti-avoidance provisions.274
Beginning in the late 1960s, several UK tax treaties began to include provisions
denying reduced withholding tax rates under interest and royalty articles if the debt
claim or right in respect of which the interest or royalty was paid “was created or
assigned mainly for the purposes of taking advantage of this article and not for
bona fide commercial purposes.”275 In the 1992 UK-Guyana tax treaty, this language
was modified to deny treaty benefits under these articles if “the main purpose or
one of the main purposes of any person concerned with the creation or assignment”
of the debt-claim or right in respect of which the interest or royalty was paid was
“to take advantage of this Article by means of that creation or assignment.”276 As a
result, these provisions dropped the “bona fide commercial purposes” test, lowered
the purpose threshold to include transactions or arrangements where “one of the
main purposes” was to obtain the reduced withholding tax rate, and expanded
the scope of the purpose inquiry to encompass “any person concerned with the
creation or assignment” of the debt-claim or right.277
Subsequent UK tax treaties have generally included these limitations in interest
and royalty articles and occasionally in the “other income” article,278 and the OECD
273 According to article XI(2) of the 1942 Canada-US tax treaty, supra note 125, the lower
5 percent withholding tax rate (as opposed to 15 percent) was not available if “the competent
authority” of the source state was “satisfied that the corporate relationship between the two
corporations has been arranged or is maintained primarily with the intention of taking
advantage of this paragraph.” Similar language appears in article VI of the 1945 UK-US tax
treaty, supra note 126. See Vann, supra note 92, at 271, and Rosenbloom, supra note 15, at 779.
274 Jonathan Schwarz, Schwarz on Tax Treaties, 3d ed. (London: Wolters Kluwer, 2013), at 421.
275 Ibid., at 415.
276 Articles 12(9) and 13(7) of the Convention Between the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Co-operative Republic of
Guyana for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, signed at Georgetown on August 31, 1992.
277 Schwarz, supra note 274, at 421.
278 Ibid., speculating that inclusion in the “other income” article was designed to address derivative
financial instruments, which can replicate other types of income.
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adopted identical language in its 2003 revisions to the OECD commentary.279 Since
the mid-1990s, similar provisions have also been included in the tax treaties of many
other countries, mostly in interest and royalty articles,280 but also in articles dealing
with dividends281 and capital gains,282 and sometimes in separate provisions limiting
treaty benefits to different categories of income.283 In addition to these provisions,
which apply only to specific categories of income, a comprehensive purpose provision was included in the 2012 protocol to the India-UK tax treaty, stipulating that

279 Paragraph 21.4 of the commentary on article 1 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra
note 99, suggesting that this anti-abuse provision could be used to deal with source taxation of
dividends, interest, royalties, and other income.
280 See, for example, Canada’s tax treaties with Chile (Convention Between Canada and the
Republic of Chile for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, signed at Santiago on January 21, 1998) and
Ukraine (Convention Between the Government of Canada and the Government of Ukraine for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income and on Capital, signed at Kiev on March 4, 1996).
281 See, for example, Canada’s tax treaties with Hong Kong (Agreement Between the Government
of Canada and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Hong Kong on November 11, 2012);
Israel (Convention Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the State
of Israel for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at New York on September 21, 2016); Mexico (Convention
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income, signed at Mexico City on September 12, 2006); New Zealand (Convention Between
Canada and New Zealand for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at Wellington on May 3, 2012); and Poland
(Convention Between Canada and the Republic of Poland for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, signed at
Ottawa on May 14, 2012).
282 See, for example, article 13(7) of the Canada-Israel tax treaty, supra note 281.
283 See, for example, article 26(1) of the Canada-Colombia tax treaty (Convention Between
Canada and the Republic of Colombia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, signed at Lima
on November 21, 2008), which denies treaty benefits under the dividend, interest, and royalty
articles if “the purpose or one of the main purposes of any person in relation to the creation or
assignment of a share, a debt-claim, or a right with respect to which dividends, interest or
royalties are paid, was to derive benefits from one or more of those Articles through such
creation or assignment”; and article 23(2) of the Spain-UK tax treaty (Convention Between the
Kingdom of Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income and on Capital, signed at London on March 14, 2013), which denies “relief . . . under
this Convention” if “the main purpose or one of the main purposes of any person concerned
with the creation, assignment or alienation of any shares, debt-claims, assets or other rights in
respect of which income or gains arise was to take advantage of this Convention by means of
that creation, assignment or alienation.”
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[b]enefits of this Convention shall not be available to a resident of a Contracting State,
or with respect to any transaction undertaken by such a resident, if the main purpose or
one of the main purposes of the creation or existence of such a resident or of the transaction undertaken by him, was to obtain benefits under this Convention.284

Together with the OECD’s guiding principle discussed earlier,285 this generalized
purpose test is an obvious antecedent to the PPT in article 7(1) of the MLI and article 29(9) of the 2017 OECD model convention.

Other Treat y Abuses
In addition to tax treaty shopping, other transactions or arrangements may result in
tax treaty abuse where they enable persons either to obtain benefits under particular
treaty provisions in a manner that contradicts the object and purpose of these provisions or the treaty as a whole, or to circumvent the application of other treaty
provisions in a manner that contradicts their object and purpose. Examples of these
transactions or arrangements include the following:
n

n

“surplus-stripping” transactions that convert dividends that would otherwise
be subject to withholding tax under provisions comparable to article 10 of the
OECD model convention into gains from the alienation of shares that are
exempt from taxation in the state in which the company is resident under
provisions comparable to article 13 of the OECD model convention;286
“hiring-out of labour” arrangements that divert employment income that
would otherwise be paid by an employer resident in the state in which the
employment is exercised into service fees paid to an employer resident in
another state, in order to convert employment income that would otherwise
be subject to tax in the state in which the employment is exercised under
provisions comparable to article 15(1) of the OECD model convention into

284 Article 28C(1) of the Convention Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of India for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and
Capital Gains, signed at New Delhi on January 25, 1993, added by article IX of the amending
protocol of October 30, 2012. In Canada, the federal government proposed a similarly
comprehensive purpose-based anti-abuse provision in 2013, which would have applied as a
domestic override of all Canadian tax treaties. Canada, Department of Finance, Consultation
Paper on Treaty Shopping—The Problem and Possible Solutions (Ottawa: Department of Finance,
August 2013) (www.fin.gc.ca/activty/consult/ts-cf-eng.asp#a1). The government withdrew the
proposal in August 2014, choosing to await the outcome of BEPS action 6 before proceeding
further. For a critical assessment of the proposal, arguing among other things that it was
inconsistent with Canada’s tax treaty obligations, see Ken Snider, “Policy Forum: Canada’s
Anti-Treaty-Shopping Proposals and International Treaty Obligations” (2014) 62:3 Canadian
Tax Journal 705-28.
285 See supra notes 101-106 and the accompanying text.
286 See, for example, the UN report Treaty Abuse and Treaty Shopping, supra note 22, at
paragraphs 61-64.
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employment income that is exempt tax from tax in the state in which the employment is exercised under provisions comparable to article 15(2) of the
OECD model convention;287
transactions or arrangements that divert income that would otherwise be paid
to an entertainer or sportsperson in respect of personal activities exercised in
one state to a “star company” resident in a contracting state that does not
have a permanent establishment in the state in which these activities are
exercised, in order to convert income that would otherwise be subject to tax
in the state in which the activities are exercised under provisions comparable
to article 17(1) of the OECD model convention into income that would be
exempt from tax in that state under provisions comparable to article 7 of the
OECD model convention if the treaty did not include a star company provision like article 17(2) of the OECD model convention;288
indirect ownership of immovable property situated in a state in order to
convert gains from the alienation of this property that would otherwise be
taxable in that state under provisions comparable to article 13(1) of the OECD
model convention into gains from the alienation of shares or other interests
that would be exempt from tax in that state under provisions comparable
to article 13(5) if the article did not include a substituted property rule like
article 13(4) of the OECD model convention;289
transactions or arrangements that convert dividends that would otherwise be
subject to withholding tax at the high rate under provisions comparable to
article 10(2)(b) of the OECD model convention into dividends that qualify for
the low treaty rate under provisions comparable to article 10(2)(a) of the
OECD model convention on dividends paid by a subsidiary to its parent company;290 and
transactions that dilute the proportion of an entity’s value attributable to
immovable property situated in a state in order to convert gains that would
otherwise be subject to tax in that state under a substituted property rule into
gains that are exempt from tax in the state in which the immovable property
is situated under provisions comparable to article 13(5) of the OECD model
convention.291

Since these kinds of transactions or arrangements may be undertaken by persons
who are already residents of a contracting state in order to access benefits under a

287 Paragraphs 8.2-8.28 of the commentary on article 15 of the OECD model convention.
288 See, for example, the UN report Treaty Abuse and Treaty Shopping, supra note 22, at
paragraphs 54-57.
289 Ibid., at paragraphs 59-60.
290 Ibid., at paragraphs 68-69.
291 Ibid., at paragraphs 74-75.
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specific provision of a tax treaty entered into by that state, they are often labelled
“rule shopping” as opposed to “treaty shopping.”292
Unlike objections to tax treaty shopping, which address the objects and purposes
of tax treaties as a whole,293 objections to treaty rule shopping emphasize the objects
and purposes of specific treaty provisions themselves, which may be undermined by
transactions and arrangements that qualify for benefits under a specific provision
or circumvent the application of a less advantageous provision in a manner contrary to the object and purpose of these provisions.294 Where an entertainer or
sportsperson diverts income from personal activities exercised in one state to a star
company resident in another state in order to avoid a treaty provision that would
otherwise allow this income to be taxed in the state in which the activities are exercised, for example, this diversion circumvents the application of the treaty provision
in a way that may defeat its underlying object or purpose of allowing the state in
which these activities are exercised to tax the income from these activities. Likewise,
where the incorporation of immovable property situated in one state allows a person
resident in another state to avoid a treaty provision that would otherwise allow the
first state to tax gains from the alienation of the property, the incorporation and
alienation of shares circumvents the application of the treaty provision in a way that
may defeat its underlying object or purpose of allowing the state in which immovable property is situated to tax gains from the alienation of such property. Moreover,
to the extent that these and other rule-shopping transactions or arrangements facilitate unintended non-taxation or reduced taxation, treaty rule shopping raises the
same concerns as tax treaty shopping.295
As with tax treaty shopping, states have relied on domestic anti-avoidance
doctrines and rules as well as treaty-based anti-avoidance rules to counteract many
of these rule-shopping transactions or arrangements. In order to deny treaty benefits
that could otherwise be available through surplus-stripping transactions that convert
dividends into gains from the alienation of shares, for example, some states have
relied on domestic anti-avoidance doctrines while others have introduced specific
statutory anti-avoidance rules that recharacterize proceeds from certain share transactions as dividends.296 Although it might be argued that these domestic
292 See, for example, Adolfo J. Martín Jiménez, “Domestic Anti-Abuse Rules and Double Taxation
Treaties: A Spanish Perspective—Part I” (2002) 56:11 Bulletin for International Fiscal
Documentation 542-53, at 543; De Broe, supra note 18, at 10; and Danon and Salomé, supra
note 2, at 214.
293 See supra notes 19-23 and the accompanying text.
294 Final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at 69.
295 See, for example, the UN report Treaty Abuse and Treaty Shopping, supra note 22, at
paragraph 32.
296 In the Netherlands, for example, the tax authorities have sought to rely on the fraus legis
(abuse-of-law) doctrine, apparently without success. De Broe, supra note 18, at 407-9. In
Canada, on the other hand, cross-border surplus-stripping transactions are subject to a specific
statutory anti-avoidance rule in section 212.1 of the Income Tax Act.
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anti-avoidance doctrines and statutory anti-avoidance rules contradict tax treaty
obligations,297 the OECD takes the position that these doctrines and rules do not
conflict with tax treaty obligations to the extent that they determine the characterization of transactions and arrangements to which tax treaties apply.298 The Tax
Court of Canada took a similar view in a case involving a cross-border surplusstripping transaction, concluding that it would be
a surprising conclusion that Canada, or indeed any of the other countries with which
it has tax treaties . . . had intentionally or inadvertently bargained away its right to deal
with tax avoidance or tax evasion by residents of treaty countries in its own domestic
tax laws . . . [and] equally surprising if tax avoidance schemes that are susceptible of
attack under either general anti-avoidance provisions or specific anti-avoidance rules,
if carried out by Canadian residents, could be perpetuated with impunity by nonresidents under the protection of a treaty.299

Likewise for hiring-out of labour arrangements, the OECD commentary notes
that “many States” have developed “various legislative or jurisprudential rules and
criteria” in order to distinguish “cases where services rendered by an individual to
an enterprise should be considered to be rendered in an employment relationship
(contract of service) from cases where such services should be considered to be
rendered under a contract for the provision of services between two separate enterprises (contract for services).”300 In addition, the commentary explains:

297 This appears to have been the basis for decisions in the Netherlands in which the courts
rejected the argument that capital gains should be recharacterized as dividends.
298 Paragraphs 73 and 76-80 of the commentary on article 1 of the OECD model convention. For
an exhaustive analysis of the relationship between domestic anti-avoidance rules and tax
treaties, see Jinyan Li and Daniel Sandler, “The Relationship Between Domestic AntiAvoidance Legislation and Tax Treaties” (1997) 45:5 Canadian Tax Journal 891-958.
299 RMM Canadian Enterprises Inc. et al. v. The Queen, 97 DTC 302, at paragraph 56 (TCC). The
court’s conclusion that section 212.1 of the Income Tax Act did not conflict with provisions of
the Canada-US tax treaty also turned on the text of article X(3) of that treaty, which defines a
dividend to include “income that is subjected to the same treatment as income from shares
under the laws of the State in which the payer is a resident.” For a useful discussion of the case
in the context of OECD commentaries on the relationship between tax treaties and domestic
anti-avoidance rules, see Arnold, supra note 107, at 249-52.
300 Paragraph 8.4 of the commentary on article 15 of the OECD model convention. In the event
that states have not adopted such legislative or jurisprudential rules, the commentary
explains that states are free to adopt bilaterally a provision along the following lines:
Paragraph 2 of this Article shall not apply to remuneration derived by a resident of a
Contracting State in respect of an employment exercised in the other Contracting State
and paid by, or on behalf of, an employer who is not a resident of that other State if:
a) the recipient renders services in the course of that employment to a person other
than the employer and that person, directly or indirectly, supervises, directs or controls
the manner in which those services are performed; and
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[E]ven where the domestic law of the State that applies the Convention does not offer
the possibility of questioning a formal contractual relationship and therefore does not
allow the State to consider that services rendered to a local enterprise by an individual
who is formally employed by a non-resident are rendered in an employment relationship (contract of service) with that local enterprise, that State may deny the application
of the exception [in article 15(2)] in abusive cases.301

As a result, the commentary concludes, these transactions or arrangements may be
challenged either under domestic anti-avoidance doctrines or statutory general
anti-avoidance rules, or as an abuse of the convention itself.302
In order to address the diversion of income to star companies, on the other hand,
the OECD model convention was amended in 1977 to allow states in which personal
activities are exercised by an entertainer or sportsperson to tax income in respect of
those activities that accrues to a person other than the entertainer or sportsperson.303
As the OECD commentary explains, this provision allows states whose domestic law
does not allow them to look through these arrangements “to impose a tax on the
profits diverted from the income of the entertainer or sportsperson to the enterprise.”304 In the years since 1977, a corresponding star company provision has been
added to many bilateral tax treaties.305
The OECD model convention was also amended to eliminate treaty benefits that
could otherwise be obtained through indirect ownership of immovable property, by
adding a provision that extends source-state jurisdiction to gains derived by a resident of a contracting state from the alienation of shares “deriving more than 50 per
cent of their value directly or indirectly from immovable property situated in the
other Contracting State.”306 Based on an earlier provision in the 1980 UN model

b) those services constitute an integral part of the business activities carried on by
that person.
Paragraph 8.3 of the commentary on article 15 of the OECD model convention.
301 Paragraph 8.8 of the commentary on article 15 of the OECD model convention.
302 This conclusion was clear from paragraph 8.9 of the commentary on article 15, which
specifically referred to paragraph 9.4 of the commentary on article 1. These paragraphs were
deleted with the 2017 revisions to the commentary. For a useful discussion of the commentaries
on article 15, see Luc De Broe and Katrina Petrosovitch, “The Concepts of ‘Employment’ and
‘Employer’ Under Article 15 of the OECD Model Convention,” in Essays on Tax Treaties: A
Tribute to David A. Ward, supra note 88, 207-38.
303 Article 17(2) of the OECD model convention.
304 Paragraph 11(c) of the commentary on article 17 of the OECD model convention. For a useful
review of this provision, see Dick Molenaar and Harald Grams, “Rent-a-Star—The Purpose of
Article 17(2) of the OECD Model” (2002) 56:10 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation
500-9.
305 See, for example, article XVI(2) of the Canada-US tax treaty, supra note 48.
306 Article 13(4) of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra note 99. As will be explained in the
second part of this article, this provision was amended following BEPS action 6 to also include
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convention307 and consistent with prior treaty practice of many states, including
Canada,308 the obvious purpose of this provision is “to prevent the avoidance of
taxes on the gains from the sale of immovable property,” which would otherwise be
“relatively easy to avoid . . . through the incorporation of a company to hold such
property.”309 As with the star company rule, this “substituted property rule” has also
been added to many bilateral tax treaties.310
Treaty-based specific anti-avoidance provisions have also been relied on to ensure
that the reduced withholding tax rate on dividends paid by a subsidiary to a parent
company is available only if the subsidiary is a “real subsidiary” that “was genuinely
owned long term by the parent.”311 As explained earlier,312 the dividend article in
the 1942 Canada-US tax treaty included anti-abuse language denying the lower
withholding tax rate where the relationship between the two corporations “has been
arranged and is maintained primarily with the intention of taking advantage of this
paragraph.”313 This provision is a clear antecedent to contemporary purpose tests
that deny all benefits under the dividend articles of tax treaties if
it was the main purpose or one of the main purposes of any person concerned with the
creation or assignment of the shares or other rights in respect of which the dividend is
paid to take advantage of this Article by means of that creation or assignment.314

gains from the alienation of other interests deriving their value primarily from immovable
property, and to apply where this proportionate value threshold is met at “any time during the
365 days preceding the alienation” of the shares or comparable interests. These amendments
are also included in article 9(1) of the MLI.
307 United Nations, Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries
(New York: United Nations, 1980), article 13(4). For a detailed discussion of the capital gains
article in model tax conventions, see David W. Smith, “Model Conventions and the Capital
Gains Article,” in Essays on Tax Treaties: A Tribute to David A. Ward, supra note 88, 147-205,
at 181.
308 Luca Taglialatela, “Treaty Abuse and Passive Income: Holding Period for Intercompany
Dividends and Modifications to Article 13 Para. 4 OECD MC,” in Daniel W. Blum and
Markus Seiler, eds., Preventing Treaty Abuse (Vienna: Linde, 2016), 463-98, at 489-90.
309 United Nations, United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and
Developing Countries (New York: United Nations, 2011), paragraph 8 of the commentary on
article 13.
310 For a list of Canada’s tax treaties with and without this rule, see David N. Finkelstein and
Ronald K. Durand, “The Substituted Property Rule in Article 13 of the OECD and UN
Model Tax Conventions,” in Essays on Tax Treaties: A Tribute to David A. Ward, supra note 88,
103-45, at 132-42.
311 Vann, supra note 92, at 271-72.
312 See supra note 273 and the accompanying text.
313 Article XI(2) of the 1942 Canada-US tax treaty, supra note 125. Similar language appeared in
article VI of the 1945 UK-US tax treaty, supra note 273.
314 See, for example, article 10(8) of the Canada-UK tax treaty, supra note 242.
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Although these provisions may be used to challenge tax-treaty-shopping transactions
or arrangements, they may also be used to challenge rule-shopping transactions or
arrangements undertaken to obtain a reduced withholding tax rate on dividends
paid by a subsidiary to a parent company.315 Even without these specific antiavoidance provisions, however, the OECD commentary has taken the position that
the reduced withholding tax rate under the dividend article “should not be granted
in cases of the abuse of the provision”—for example, where a company increases its
shareholding “shortly before . . . dividends become payable . . . primarily for the
purpose of securing” the low withholding tax rate, or “where the qualifying holding
was arranged primarily in order to obtain the reduction.”316
In contrast to these measures to counteract treaty rule shopping, there appears
to have been less concern, until recently, about transactions designed to circumvent
the substituted property rules by diluting the proportion of an entity’s value attributable to immovable property prior to the alienation of shares or other interests.
After these transactions were identified as a type of treaty abuse in the 2006 United
Nations report Treaty Abuse and Treaty Shopping,317 however, the UN model tax convention was amended to include a provision extending source-state taxation to
[g]ains . . . derived by a resident of a Contracting State from the alienation of shares of
a company which is a resident of the other Contracting State . . . if the alienator, at any
time during the 12-month period preceding such alienation, held directly or indirectly
at least ___ per cent (the percentage is to be established through bilateral negotiations)
of the capital of that company.318

As will be explained in more detail in the second part of this article, a similar antiabuse provision appears in article 9(1)(a) of the MLI, which has been incorporated
into article 13(4) of the OECD model convention.
According to the final report on BEPS action 6, “targeted specific treaty antiabuse rules” such as these “generally provide greater certainty for both taxpayers
and tax administrations” than general anti-abuse provisions like the PPT.319 What is
less clear is the relationship between these specific anti-avoidance rules and a

315 In this circumstance, however, it appears that the effect of the rule is to deny all benefits under
the dividend article, even including the higher withholding tax rate on dividends! As the second
part of this article will explain, a similar result may occur under the PPT if it is not
accompanied by a remedial provision like article 7(4) of the MLI.
316 Paragraph 17 of the commentary on article 10 of the 2003 OECD model convention, supra
note 99. As will be explained in the second part of this article, concerns about this type of rule
shopping underlie the anti-abuse provision in article 8(1) of the MLI, which was incorporated
into article 10(2)(a) of the OECD model convention.
317 Supra note 22.
318 Article 13(5) of the UN model tax convention, supra note 309.
319 Final report on BEPS action 6, supra note 9, at paragraph 27.
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general anti-abuse provision, and the extent to which a general anti-abuse provision
like the PPT can be applied to rule-shopping transactions or arrangements that are
not subject to a specific anti-abuse rule in a CTA . This and other issues concerning
the MLI and the PPT will be taken up in the second part of this article, which will
appear in a subsequent issue of this journal.

